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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, a body 
politic of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VICTOR SMITH, 
Plaintiff, Case No. 86-0343 
vs. (Category 13) 
CLEARFIELD CITY, a 
municipality of the State 
of Utah and CLEARFIELD CITY 
PLANNING COMMISSION. 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the lower court erred in finding that the 
Clearfield City Council and Clearfield City Planning 
Coiranission had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and without 
basis in fact in denying a conditional|use permit to the 
plaintiff Davis County. 
2. Whether the lower court committed reversible error 
in finding that Clearfield City unconstitutionally applied 
Section 11 Chapter 12 of the Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance 
in violation of Section 7 and Section (24 of Article I of the 
Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
At the time Plaintiff applied for a conditional use permit 
Clearfield City had enacted a zoning ordinance which contained 
the administration and procedures for conditional use permits 
as well as provided for various zones throughout the city. 
Section 11, Chapter 2 and Section 11, Chapter 12 of the then 
existing Clearfield City Ordinances are pertinent to this 
appeal and are attached herein as part of the Appendix. It 
should be noted, however, that these ordinances were substan-
tially revised in the fall of 1984 and therefore the present 
ordinances include substantial changes. Reference will be 
made to these changes when appropriate during the Argument 
portion of the Brief but verbatim duplication of these revised 
ordinances is not required. 
A state statute relating to residential facilities for 
handicapped persons as contained in Section 10-9-2.5, U.C.A. 
is also included as an addendum to this Brief. While such 
statute is not directly in point there are certain portions 
of the statute which can be utilized by analogy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
On June 25, 1934 Plaintiff-Respondent Davis County made 
application with defendant-appellant Clearfield City for a 
conditional use permit to operate a "residential treatment 
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ity Council voted to 
program for adolescents and adults experiencing substance 
abuse and mental illness.11 A hearing was held on July 18, 
19 84 before the Clearfield City Planning Commission. The 
Commission in a three to one vote denied the application. 
Subsequently the plaintiff appealed to the Clearfield City 
Council. 
A public meeting was held on Septeijnber 11, 1984 and 
continued until October 9, 1984. The C 
uphold the decision of the Planning Commission to deny the 
conditional use permit. Suit was commenced in the District 
Court of Davis County on November 7, 19^4 alleging that the 
actions of the Clearfield City Council bnd its Planning 
Commission were both unconstitutional and arbitrary and 
capricious. 
The matter was tried to the Honora|ble Douglas L. Cornaby 
on April 24 and April 25 of 1986. The 
decision on May 28, 19 86 ruling in favoj 
ordering that a writ of mandamus be iss| 
City to issue a conditional use permit.! 
Conclusions of Law were signed on May 2 
Defendants' request for a stay of execution was denied and 
Appellants filed a timely Notice of Appeal on July 23, 1986 
court issued a memorandum 
r of the plaintiff and 
ued requiring Clearfield 
Findings of Fact and 
, 1986. Thereafter, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There have been two forums in whidh the evidence in this 
case has been gathered. First, the proceedings before the 
Clearfield City Planning Commission an^ City Council and 
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second the testimony given before the District Court. In 
reviewing this case this Court must conduct its own independent 
review of the City's actions considering both the evidence 
before the City Council and Planning Commission as well as 
additional evidence introduced before the District Court 
which is relevant to the issues considered by the City. 
Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 
(Utah 1984). 
For this reason, therefore, the facts in this case will 
be presented in chronological sequence based both upon the 
events occuring before the City officials and the testimony 
given in the District Court. No attempt will be made to 
identify additional evidence which was introduced at trial 
(relevant to the issues considered by the City) but which was 
not actually presented during the City proceedings. Appellant 
represents, however, that this type of evidence is minimal 
and that the overwhelming majority of the evidence given during 
the lower court proceeding was also given to the City officials. 
THE EXISTING ADDICTION RECOVERY CENTER (ARC) 
In 19 81 Davis County through its executive director of 
the Davis County Mental Health Department applied for a 
conditional use permit to allow the construction of a 
facility known as the Addiction Recovery Center (ADC). At 
that time, Dr. Williams represented to the Planning Commission 
that he had no reason nor any intention to request any other 
similar facilities in the same area. (Tr. 323). 
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At that time an adjoining property owner Victor Smith was 
very much opposed to the building of this facility• (Tr. 42-4 3) 
The ARC was constructed in 19 81 and treats adults who are 
experiencing or recovering from chemical addiction. (Tr. 72). 
The testimony was consistent that this facility had caused no 
problems during its years of operation, was maintained in a 
clean and efficient manner, and had a gtood reputation in the 
community for its operation. (Tr. 43, 142, 334-36) . 
Since 19 79 the area in which this ARC facility is located 
is zoned PO which stands for Professional Offices. (Tr. 137, 
101-102) . 
THE 19 84 APPLICATION FOR A NEWI 
In the spring of 19 84 the county a| 
Smith about acquiring his property for 
FACILITY 
bproached Mr. Victor 
a new facility. It 
had been determined by the mental health officials that this 
area of the county was in need of a new facility in that 
particular area. After several refusals Mr. Smith decided to 
sell to the county for this purpose. (|Tr. 42) . 
Mr. Smith's property is adjacent to the existing ARC 
facility with a vacant lot in between. (Tr. 139). His 
property was appraised for $230,000 butt he agreed to sell it 
to the county for $205,000 cash. The offer was made subject 
to approval by the Clearfield City zoning officials. (Tr. 
153-54). 
Dr. Williams stated that after he had signed this earnest 
money agreement with Mr. Smith he met with the Clearfield City 
planning officials to discuss the proposed facility. He was 
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told that for a new facility to be approved it would have to 
be classified as a conditional use allowance under a "con-
valescent center" exception and that it would have to be 
submitted to the Clearfield City Planning Commission. (Tr. 20). 
On June 26, 1984 an application was made for the new 
facility. (Plaintiff's Ex. 1). Attachment A to the applica-
tion summarizes the proposed use for the Smith residence. It 
stated the following: 
Existing home to be utilized as a boarding house 
and convalescent center. 
To be utilized by Davis County Mental Health Center 
as a residential treatment program for adolescents and 
adults experiencing substance abuse and mental illness. 
Length of stay: average 90-120 days. 
Type of people admitted: Those individuals in the 
Level 3 phase of treatment. Level 1 being in-patient 
treatment, Level 2 being comprehensive treatment, Level 
3 being structured living environment, Level 4 being 
out-patient services. 
Level 3 individuals would need a minimum of super-
vision and would be working or actively engaged in the 
community during the stay. Support group and group 
therapy would also be provided at the facility, as well 
as day treatment. 
Staff will be located on the premises 24 hours 
per day. (Plaintiff's Ex. 1). 
MEETING OF THE CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING COMMISSION ON JULY 
18, 1984 
Dr. Williams attended a Clearfield City Planning Commission 
hearing on July 18, 19 84. The minutes of that meeting were 
introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. At the meeting Dr. 
Williams stated that the facility would house sixteen to eighteen 
individuals with half being adults and half being adolescents 
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twelve years of age or older. He statedJ the facility would 
be used for mental health, alcohol rehabilitation and drug 
abuse. (Plaintifffx Ex. 3; Tr. 21). DrL Williams testified 
that the hearing took around two and a half hours at which time 
he presented various documents to the commissioners. A large 
number of people from the community were in attendance. (Tr. 
20). He stated that there were many individuals throughout 
the county who were in need of this typ^ of help to improve 
their health and well-being. He asserted that this type of 
facility would contribute to the general well-being of the 
community. (Tr. 22) . 
He recalled that he addressed all cpf the concerns of those 
present. As to parking, for example, h^ agreed to purchase the 
vacant lot in between the existing ARC 
house to provide additional parking. CJTr. 23) . As to increased 
crime he produced several letters from various police depart-
ments which stated that they had not had any increase in crime 
as a result of these type of facilities) 
Officer Bill Nelson of the Clearfield Cc 
explained to the commissioners that he 
proposed facility would increase the crld 
:acility and the Smith 
(Ex. 6, Tr. 26) . 
tLty Police Department 
did not believe the 
lime rate but that it 
could cause future problems. (Plaintifffs Ex. 3; Tr. 25) 
Some of the adjoining property owners, 
voiced their concern that the new facility would lower their 
according to Dr. Williams, 
property values. No real estate apprai 
give any official information. (Tr. 30) 
Dr. Williams acknowledged that the) 
sers were present to 
re were numerous views 
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and opinions represented in the meeting and that there was 
a lengthy period of time in which all individuals were given 
an opportunity to express themselves during the meeting. (Tr. 
76). Many of these people expressed their concern that they 
did not want to change the residential nature of the neigh-
borhood, that they were fearful about dangers being presented 
with a second facility and were worried about property values. 
These types of perceptions, according to Dr. Williams, are 
consistent with the perceptions of other people throughout 
the country as to these kinds of facilities. (Tr. 32-33). 
Finally, there was considerable discussion about the 
location of the facility directly across the street from a 
junior high school. Several sepakers voiced their concern 
that this junior high presence would have a negative impact 
on the young individuals in the treatment program who were 
being placed in close proximity where drug trafficking was 
available. (Tr. 32). 
Wilford Summerkorn related how he was employed by Davis 
County but was also the Clearfield City Planner under a contract 
arrangement between the County and the City. (Tr. 9 8-99) . 
He stated that he prepared a report for the Planning Commission 
after investigating the application of the County. He submitted 
this report to the Planning Commission on the evening of the 
hearing. A portion of that report states the following: 
A question that has been raised by some is the 
appropriateness of having two such facilities located 
so close together. Land uses of this type are often 
viewed as being somewhat undesirable for a variety 
of reasons, most of them personal reasons of home 
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owners in their vicinity. Undesirable land uses 
can be located in communities in one of two ways: 
they can be grouped together to minimize the impact 
on other areas of the community, though they may 
then more severely impact the area ithey are located 
in, or they may be spread throughout the city to 
lessen the impact in any one location and "share 
the wealth", so to speak. 
The only guide or precedence 
may have as to what policy to foil' 
regulations for residential facili 
handicapped. Handicapped faciliti< 
health facilties are far from iden* 
of the impacts may be similar. CI 
regulations for the handicapped fa< 
that no two facilities be located 
mile from each other. This, then, 
the idea of disbursing such facili 
the community rather than concentr. 
that Clearfield 
|>w would be the 
;ies for the 
>s and mental 
:ical, but some 
Garfield1 s 
:ilities require 
:loser than one 
tends to follow 
:ies throughout 
tting them. 
There are some important differences in this 
case, however. The mental health facility will be 
located in an office area, rather than in a residential 
area, residents do exist immediately adjacent to this 
site, however. (Plaintiff's Ex. 1]7) . 
Mr. Summerkorn stated that in his topinion this particular 
usage would not have been detrimental at that location. He 
pe city that were equally 
this type of site 
stated that there were other sites in t 
suitable from a planning standpoint for 
including areas along Main or State Street and near the North 
Davis Hospital. (Tr. 109). Mr. Summerkorn also recalled the 
concern about the proximity to the junior high school and 
the statements made concerning several (incidences which occurred 
between the existing ARC facility and tdhe junior high school 
students. (Tr. 110-11). Mr. Summerkorn believed that addi-
tional information was presented to thq 
later meetings which was not presented 
commission meeting. (Tr. 123). 
City Council in the 
at the initial zoning 
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Mr. Summerkorn concluded by noting that in his opinion 
the use of this facility could have been approved by the 
Zoning Commission but on the other hand it could also have been 
denied. There was conflicting information about property values, 
density of these type of facilities, and the impact on the 
junior high school. (Tr. 128). 
Vern Hamblin is a member of the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission and had been for eight years at the time of the 
hearing. Mr. Hamblin made a motion to the commission that 
the permit be denied. The motion was carried with three members 
voting to deny the permit and one voting in favor of it. He 
voted against the addition of this facility for several reasons 
including the perceived fear of the residents which lived in 
the area about these type of additional facilities, future 
congestion with having two facilities together, and the proximity 
of the junior high school to the proposed facility. (Tr. 303-07) . 
Mr. Hamblin acknowledged that there was no direct testimony that 
the new facility would cause any increase in the crime rate 
but noted that it could cause possible future problems. 
(Tr. 304). He also admitted that there was no actual impact 
study made on property values nor was anyone from the junior 
high invited to appear at the hearing to give their opinion. 
(Tr. 312-14). He also acknowledged that he did not know the 
history of any incidences between the patients in the existing 
ARC facility and the junior high students but stated that 
this history was not as relevant since the present facility 
did not have juveniles in it. (Tr. 317-20). 
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Ivan Anderson explained that in 19^4 he was both the 
Chairman of the Zoning Commission and a|so a member of the 
Clearfield City Council. As Chairman ot the Planning 
Commission he had no vote. (Tr. 322) . Ife recalled that at 
the two-hour meeting there was much discussion by the people 
present concerning a variety of issues including the older 
citizens who were afraid of the impact ^n additional facility 
would have on their property. There wap also discussion as 
to what effect these two facilities woufld have as to the 
density of the area, the compatibility pf one facility being 
for adults while the other for youth, and the relationship 
between the junior high and the proposed facility. (Tr. 325). 
After the Planning Commission had denied the application Mr. 
Anderson met with Dr. Williams and another council member 
and told him that he was against the new facility because of 
the density of adding two facilities ir} the same location 
and because of Dr. Williams1 prior representation that no other 
facilities would be requested in that ^rea. (Tr. 327-28) . 
CITY COUNCIL MEETING SEPTEMBER 11, 1984 
The County through its Executive director filed an appeal 
to the Clearfield City Council requesting that the conditional 
use permit be granted. A public hearing was held before the 
Clearfield City Council as reflected by the official minutes 
introduced i~to evidence. (Plaintiff£ Ex. 10). In addition, 
a secretary for the Davis County Mental Health Department 
recorded the entire meeting and subsequently transcribed the 
proceedings. This transcription was admitted into evidence. 
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(Plaintifffs Ex. 12). 
Essentially much of the same information that had been 
received during the zoning commission was resubmitted during 
this hearing. The Davis County Mental Health Department 
through its county attorney and others requested the City to 
specifically list why the zoning commission had denied the 
previous request for a conditional use application. No 
response was received from the zoning commission. (Tr. 34-35) . 
The meeting before the City Council also lasted approxi-
mately two hours. (Tr. 35). Dr. Williams explained the type 
of treatment which would be utilized in the proposed facility 
as well as the composition of the patients. He emphasized 
that this would not be a facility to teach the mentally 
retarded but to assist the mental health of various individuals 
with problems such as alcohol addiction, drug abuse, depression, 
and stress. The residents would be substance free before they 
reached this phase of treatment. He stated that some of the 
people in the facility would be under court supervision but 
that the majority would be there on their own accord. (Plain-
tiff's Ex. 10; Tr. 74). At this meeting discussion centered 
around the potential dangerousness of these people, the com-
patibility with the residential atmosphere and the feared 
reduction of property values. Additional questions were also 
asked about the mental health budget and about the county's 
ability to pay for the facility. (Tr. 62). 
Shirley Reed, a councilwoman for Clearfield City, stated 
that she had previously attended the Planning Commission meeting 
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Facilities on Property 
by her in the September 
lie there were six studies 
having been asked to attend by some of llier constituents 
(Tr. 160). During the interim between the two meetings Mrs 
Reed obtained a document from the American Planning Associa-
tion entitled "The Effect of Group Care 
Values.f" This document was referred to 
11 meeting. (Plaintifffs Ex. 10; Plainfcifffs Ex. 18; Tr. 163) 
It was her opinion that these studies showed that con-
centrated density of group homes has ari| impact on the charac-
terization of property and their value ^nd it was recommended 
I 
that planners look at disbursing the fapilities rather than 
putting them in a clustering area. Whi 
contained in the report Mrs. Reed focusled upon one done in 
Oakland, California in 198 3 since the t|ype of group home popu-
lation involved was identical to that proposed by Davis County 
namely persons with mental health problems, alcohol problems 
and drug problems. Councilwoman Reed noted that she had done 
a lot of research on her own during this interim period and had 
gone to the library to examine these studies. She received a 
copy of the Wolch Study from the University of Southern 
California which had examined the Oakland, California situation. 
The memorandum from the APA Planning Advisory Service 
was generally favorable to the placement of group homes and 
noted that fears normally expressed as [to increased criminal 
activities and de :reased property values are not well founded 
In summarizing the Oakland, California 
Stuart Gabriel and Jennifer wolch evaluated the 
impact of human service facilities upon property 
values in the most recent study oiji this issue. Human 
study the report stated: 
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service facilities were defined as halfway houses 
and group homes for populations with mental health, 
alcohol and drug problems. From their research, the 
authors discovered a relationship between different 
types of group care facilities and surrounding 
property values. Both juvenile and adult residential 
facilities adversely affected prices. Furthermore, 
the strength and impact of this effect was greater 
from facilities for adults than from those for 
juveniles. Therefore, this study runs counter to 
the mainstream of past research, which discounts 
the notion of a negative association between group 
care facilities and the neighboring property values. 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 18). 
Councilwoman Reed admitted that this study involved a 
ghetto type of situation in California which was not present 
in Clearfield but still maintained that the results on property 
values was analogous because of the similar type of facility 
in the study. (Tr. 175-76) . 
Don W. Baird is the City Manager of Clearfield who has a 
bachelorfs degree in planning emphasis and a master's degree 
in public administration. He had worked for two years with the 
Ogden Redevelopment Agency and ten years with the City of Orem 
as a senior planner. (Tr. 217). 
Mr. Baird stated that after the County had been denied 
the application by the Planning Commission, he became involved 
in setting up a hearing before the City Council. Prior to the 
meeting he conducted research in planning journals and also 
reviewed legal cases from the Utah Supreme Court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court. He spoke with some of the people in the planning 
staff and also with Dr. Williams. He was contacted by several 
individuals in the neighborhood about their concerns. (Tr. 
220-223) . 
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At the hearing on September 21 Mr. Baird recalled that he 
did not make any specific recommendation to the City Council 
but merely repeated what the Planning Commission had recommended. 
He told them that in his opinion, with tphe information that had 
been supplied, they could either approve the application or deny 
it. He did not attempt to influence th^m in either direction. 
(Tr. 223). When asked as to his personal opinion of the appro-
priateness of this site he stated that he believed the home 
was appropriate for such a facility. H<pwever, because it was 
immediately adjacent to the existing facility which provided 
the same type of service for a different segment of the popu-
lation that this was not an appropriate! site because of the 
increased impact upon the surrounding neighborhood. (Tr. 25 3). 
In other words, the Victor Smith property was an appropriate 
property for this facility Tiad it not bleen next to the present 
existing facility. (Tr. 254). 
He explained that by doubling the size of the facility 
an adverse impact on the surrounding neighborhood occurs which 
affects the quality of life of those persons. Quality of life 
includes noise, traffic generation, density, and the perception 
of people living in the area. He statqd that if a little old 
lady who lives in the surrounding neighborhood is scared to 
death and has to continually lock her doors and windows and is 
afraid to go out at night because of the existence of the 
facility that such fear is a real factor even if the woman's 
perception is based entirely upon fals^ premises. (Tr. 259). 
At the conclusion of the public hearing a motion was made 
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to continue the public hearing until October 9 at 7:15 p.m. 
"so that the Council can study all research available and get 
a legal opinion concerning the conditional use permit." 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 10). After the meeting Mr. Baird, the city 
manager, was directed by the Council to make a study of the 
area as to other social services being provided as well as to 
get more information from Davis County Mental Health on questions 
which were still in the mind of the council members. (Tr. 
204, 329). Mr. Baird stated that the additional questions 
centered around the types of facilities located in different 
communities, the various stages of treatment which were occurring 
in the county, as well as a breakdown of which facilities were 
in commercial uses and which were in residential uses. The 
Council wanted to know about all the facilities within a 
one mile radius and also what facilities were located in Layton. 
(Tr. 226) . 
ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BY CITY OFFICIALS 
Between the September 11 meeting and the proposed October 
9 meeting Mr. Baird contacted Dr. Williams concerning certain 
of the questions asked by the City Council. Exhibit 16 is a 
response given by the County dated October 1, 19 84. The 
questions concerned the definitions of levels being treated at 
each home in Bountiful, Farmington, Layton, and Clearfield as 
well as the total number of persons being treated for various 
types of social needs. In addition, the study showed percentages 
of persons being treated with alcohol or drug related problems 
within the last thirty days. Finally, the study showed the 
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Davis County Mental Health budget. 
In addition, Mr. Baird prepared twq 
concerns of the Council. Exhibit 1 was 
Clearfield City Building Department and 
map of the area around the applicant site. The aerial photo 
maps to address the 
obtained from the 
is a topography aerial 
e map were made by Mr. 
areas which he believed 
was taken in 1984 and the markings on thf€ 
Baird. On the map Mr. Baird identified 
could be called neighborhoods. He admitted it was discretionary 
but was based upon his experience as to iwhat neighborhoods 
would be affected by the new facility. The purpose of the map 
was to identify the neighborhood where the impact would be 
greatest if the present ARC facility wa$ doubled in size. 
(Tr. 232-33). 
Based upon his assessment of that heighborhood he con-
cluded that the existing ARC facility included about 5% of 
the land area and that if the vacant lot to be used as a parking 
lot together with the Victor Smith property were to be included 
then these combined facilities would constitute 11% of the 
area. (Tr. 2 34). In addition he prepared a map showing the 
various city zones and the location of pasic social services 
within a one mile diameter. (Plaintiff 
on this map the Pioneer School which isj 
tional training for the mentally handicapped, the existing ARC 
facility, the Clearfield Convalescent Center and the Division 
of Family Services Center. 
!s Ex. 3). He identified 
a facility for voca-
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THE OCTOBER 9, 1984 CITY COUNCIL MEETING AND 
ITS PRE-MEETING 
As was customary with the City Council the members met 
in a conference room approximately one hour prior to the 
beginning of the public hearing. While these meetings are 
open to the public no one is specifically invited to attend. 
The pre-meeting is noticed, however, in the agenda for that 
evening. (Tr. 211)-. 
Councilman Anderson stated that during the pre-meeting 
Mr. Baird presented a map as well as the information given to 
him by Davis County Mental Health. (Tr. 329-331) . During 
this pre-meeting Mr. Anderson stated that the Council was 
shown Exhibit 1 by Mr. Baird and that the discussion lasted 
about five or ten minutes. There was no discussion regarding 
how the individual members would vote and Mr. Anderson stated 
his surprise that Mrs. Reed voted against the site since she 
seemed to be in favor of it at the pre-meeting. (Tr. 345). 
Mr. Baird testified that he informed the Council as to 
his findings and disbursed information to them given to him 
by the Davis County Mental Health Department. There was no 
decision made relative by the group as a whole as to how they 
were going to vote. He stated it was quite the contrary since 
at least three of the council members commented that it was 
a very sensitive issue and that they had strong feelinqs both 
ways. Mr. Baird did not make any recommendation either for 
or against the application. (Tr. 243-44) . 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 is the official Clearfield City 
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Council Meeting Minutes of October 9, 1384. Plaintifffs 
Exhibit 13 is the transcript which was nfiade by the Plaintiff. 
The transcript shows that Councilwoman Reed stated her concern 
that the City of Clearfield had been responsive to the 
community!s and county's special needs ipy the establishment 
of other facilities. She noted that in 
for these type of facilities the density of integration should 
be examined since there is an impact upon property values. She 
expressed her concern of locating a second group facility in 
this area where 11% of the neighborhood would involve this 
type of property. She also stated, according to the transcript: 
choosing the location 
As an elected official I feel 
responsibility in upholding the maj 
of those planning ordinances, just 
fully consider say three Artie Circles being in the 
verv same area. This would not bei 
that it is my 
jster plan and 
as I would care-
good to the 
original businesses. And I feel that from my 
charters that an elected official is to minimize 
the impact of the changes to the characteristics 
of that particular neighborhood and I feel that 
another residential group care facility at this 
particular location at 904 South state Street 
would actually maximize the impact rather than 
minimize it. (Plaintiff's Ex. 13 J p. 3). 
Councilwoman Reed then made a motion to uphold the decision 
of the Planning Commission. Further discussion then occurred 
between the members. It was brought out that between the 
September 11 meeting and that evening the Council had approved 
a new ordinance for zoning. The area now proposed was in a 
CI zone rather than a PO zone Greater flexibility under the 
new ordinance was provided for these type of facilities. 
Additional discussion occurred between the councilmen 
and Dr. Williams as to the best location for this type of 
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facility. Councilman Anderson stated: 
I am against two of them being right together 
and taking up 11% of the ground. I am against that 
and I don't think that we, and I don't know how you 
feel, that we should be stimied with or have that 
put on us that we are against that type of facility 
and I think it needs to be done and should be done 
but I don't think there should be two of them 
together. (Plaintiff's Ex. 13, p. 10). 
The minutes of the meeting reflect three reasons why the 
permit was denied. First, that Clearfield City has been 
responsive to the special needs of these types of persons by 
supporting four other facilities in the community all within 
less than a one mile radius; second, even the most favorable 
studies of group care facilities indicates that facilities 
should be disbursed to lessen the impact to property owners 
and that since a staff survey indicates 11% of the surveyed 
area would be dedicated to group care facilities this would 
result in too high a density for this particular location and 
third, as elected officials it is the responsibility of the 
council to insure the characteristics of the neighborhoods 
are minimized and that this new facility would maximize the 
impact on the area's homes, churches and schools. (Plaintiff's 
Ex. 11, p. 2). 
SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVE CITES BY CITY COUNCIL 
After the vote, the Council instructed Mr. Baird to find 
alternative sites for this type of facility (Tr. 287). A 
discussion occurred between Council members and the Davis 
County Mental Health people. One of the council members 
indicated that this vote did not mean that the City was opposed 
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to the facility although it was their opinion the City had 
certainly met its obligation to provide these type of 
facilities. The councilmen said they cqmld continue to 
provide these services and asked Mr, Baird to identify 
areas where a facility would be more appropriate. Mr. Baird 
told Dr. Williams that he would provide him with a map 
outlining areas that would be more appropriate for this 
facility. 
About a week later he gave him a m&p which showed three 
sites in the same zoning area and two in an additional area. 
(Tr. 249-251). These proposed sites included areas in a 
residential zone since the new zoning ordinances permitted 
these type of facilities as a conditional use in any residential 
zone within the City. (Tr. 247-49). 
Mr. Baird told Dr. Williams that i 
of these locations had a good chance of 
\fi his opinion all five 
getting approval since 
the Council had directed him to identify them. (Tr. 250). 
Councilwoman Reed was asked during the Itrial whether the Council 
would approve one of the three residential proposals if Dr. 
Williams decided to put a facility there. She responded that 
the City Council would look very favorably upon these facilities 
since they were suggested by the City Manager. (Tr. 196). 
Mr. Anderson also expressed his view that the Council would 
look very favorably at these sites because they were selected 
by the City and because they were not placinq two facilities 
together. (Tr. 354) . 
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SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL OF LIKE FACILITIES 
Shortly after the October 9 hearing Dr. Williams approached 
Mr. Baird about building on one of these proposed sites. Mr. 
Baird thought Dr. Williams was talking about the same facility 
proposed on the Smith property but later learned it was different. 
The new plan called for a residential health care facility 
which would treat long-term mentally ill people who had various 
problems of depression or problems with their families. Dr. 
Williams explained that this was different from that proposed 
on the Smith location and was not sponsored by the Davis County 
Mental Health. The site was approved by the City Council even 
though there was a much more organized and vocal group of 
residents living in the Valahalla subdivision who opposed 
placement of this facility. (Tr. 251-52) . 
In addition, a second facility has been built on one of 
these sites by the Davis County Family Support Center. This 
facility houses children on a short-term basis. It was 
approved by the City Council in November of 19 86. 
Under the present ordinances which have now been adopted 
by Clearfield City and which were in effect shortly after the 
October hearing of 1984 a facility such as that proposed by 
the plaintiff would qualify as a "public or quasi-public11 use 
or as a "convalescent home." As such, a conditional use permit 
c^uld be granted in any of the residential areas of the city 
together with the Cl and C2 commercial zones. (Tr. 133). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The lower court erred in findiitg the decision of the 
Clearfield City Council to be arbitrary land capricious and 
without any rational basis in fact. The standard of appellate 
review requires this Court as well as the District Court to 
examine the decision of the administrative agency in light of 
evidence and not in light of whether the decision is the same 
one which would be made by the court. The lower court dis-
counted all of the reasons given for th^ denial of the permit 
as unjustified and instead substituted its own opinion that 
the facility should be allowed. 
As a conditional use there was no tight to place this 
facility at the proposed site. The purpose of conditional 
uses is to allow flexibility of planning organizations in 
deciding where services which are beneficial to the 
community should be located. The City Council obviously did 
not decide to exclude this type of facility from the city but 
merely decided to place it in another location which was not 
immediately adjacent to an existing fac ility. 
While it is certainly easy to argue a contrary position 
that it is better to place the two facilities together the 
evidence is overwhelming that the City fcouncil made this 
decision on a rational basis and with substantial evidence 
to support it. As such, therefore, it-
arbitrary or capricious and was based i^ pon substantial facts. 
2. The Clearfield City Council did not unconstitutionally 
apply Section 11, Chapter 12 of the Clearfield Zoning Ordinance 
cannot be said to be 
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in violation of Section 7 and Section 24 of Article I of the 
Utah State Constitution and Section I of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is doubtful 
that the lower court made this decision in the first place 
since its memorandum decision does not in any way reflect a 
finding of unconstitutional conduct. However, since the Court 
did sign the Findings and Conclusions which stated this result 
this matter must be addressed. The decisions relied upon by 
the County in the lower court are inapplicable to the present 
situation since these type of facilities have not been uniformly 
excluded by the Clearfield City officials. The new ordinances 
have greatly expanded the available locations for these type 
of facilities. The location of existing facilities of this 
nature eliminate any argument of a constitutional deprivation. 
In addition, while some classes of persons may be consti-
tutionally protected to a higher degree than others the courts 
have yet afforded this protection to programs involving alcohol 
and drug abuse. This type of facility is not analogous to a 
mental retardation center or mental handicap centers which are 
referred to in the cases relied upon by the County in the 
lower court. A city such as Clearfield is certainly entitled 
to decide where these type of facilities should be located 
for the protection of both the residents of the facility and 
the residents of the city. As such, therefore, there has 
been no violation of either the United States of the Utah 
Constitutions. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE DECISION OF THE CLEARFIELD CITY 
COUNCIL WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND 
WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT. 
Before arguing the merits of this cfase it is well to 
review the standard of appellate scrutiny which is applicable 
to this case as well as the status of a conditional use permit, 
A. Neither This Court Nor the Lo^er Court May 
Substitute Its Judgment for tlfte Judgment of 
the Clearfield City Council. 
This Court on numerous occasions his defined the role 
of the judiciary in reviewing decisions of municipalities 
concerning zoning matters. This Court has stated: 
In reviewing of zoning cases the function 
of the court is narrow and its scope is limited to 
a determination of whether or not the action of the 
board of county commissioners as a legislative body 
is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious. 
. . . . The prior decisions of this Court without 
exception have laid down the rule -chat the exercise 
of the zoning power is a legislative function to be 
exercised by the legislative bodies of the munici-
palities. The wisdom of the zoning plan, its 
necessity, the nature and boundaries of the district 
to be zoned are matters which lie solely within that 
discretion. It is the policy of tlfiis Court as 
ennunciated in its prior decisions 
substituting its judgment for that 
body of the municipality. Crestvifew Holladay Home 
Owners Assn., Inc. v. Engh Floral (po. , 545 P.2d 1150, 
1152 (Utah 1976) . 
In a more recent case this Court a 
relating to presumption of validity by 
This Court stated: 
This Court has consistently he 
the complexity of factors involved 
that it will avoid 
of the legislative 
iso stated the rule 
a governing body. 
Id that due to 
in the matters 
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of zoning, as in other fields where courts review 
the actions of administrative bodies, it should be 
assumed that those charged with that responsibility 
[the board] have specialized knowledge in that field. 
Accordingly, they should be allowed a comparatively 
wide latitude of discretion; and their actions endowed 
with the presumption of correctness and validity 
which the court should not interfere with unless 
it is shown that there is no reasonable basis to 
justify the action taken. Cottonwood Heights 
Citizens Assn. v. Board of Commissioners, 593 P.2d 
140 (Utah 1979). 
Finally, in reviewing a municipal body decision which 
has been previously reviewed by a lower court an appellate court 
must weigh the reasonableness of the administrative body's 
actions independently of the lower court's finding. In 
reviewing the zoning decisions of local governing authorities, 
the appellate court must conduct an independent examination of 
the local authority's decision "without according any special 
deference to the same review conducted by the trial court." 
Northwestern College v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 
868 (Minn. 1979). 
As noted by the Court of Appeals of Minnesota the lower 
court's opinion can be utilized by this Court in its review 
but such use is limited. That Court stated: 
This is not to say that the District Court's 
decision is to be given no weight whatsoever. 
The District Court's opinion should be given such 
weight as is given to persuasive precedent or 
authority from other jurisdictions, and we must 
give due deference to its ability to judge the 
credibility of witnesses. Beyond this, however, 
we must conduct our own independent review of the 
county board's decision, considering both evidence 
before the county board and additional evidence 
introduced before the District Court which is 
relevant to the issues considered by the county 
board. City of Barnum v. County of Carlton, 357 N.W.2d 
676 (Minn. App. 1983) 
-26-
See also, Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment! 
685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984); Leschi Improvement Council v 
of Salt Lake City, 
State Highway Commission, 525 P.2d 774 ([Wash. 2d 1974). 
Appellant submits that applying tnils standard to the 
instant case can produce only one result: namely, a reversal 
of the lower court's decision and an affirmance of the 
decision of the Clearfield City Council [to deny the condi-
tional use permit. 
B. A Conditional Use Permit Vest^ Discretion 
With a Municipality as to Whether a Proposed 
Use is Appropriate for the Prqposed Site. 
It is important to remember in this case that the plaintiff 
sought to utilize the Smith home as a rehabilitation center 
under the terms of the Clearfield City Ordinances allowing for 
conditional uses. In other words, the 
the facility was not a permitted use 
proposed operation of 
these ordinances. under 
The distinction between a conditional use and a permitted use 
was made by the Court of Appeals of Oregon. That Court stated 
By providing that a given use(will only be 
allowed conditionally in a given zone, a local 
government finds that there is a possible public 
need for that use in that zone, ancjl simultaneously 
finds that introduction of that usi into that zone 
may have disadvantages that outweigh the advantages. 
While an outright permitted use can be constructed 
without seeking or obtaining any further discre-
tionary permission from planning or zoning officials, 
a conditional use cannot be constructed without: (1) 
applying for a permit, (2) which leads to a quasi-
judicial hearing, and (3) the granting of a permit, 
based upon a discretionary decision by planning 
officials that the advantages of the specific proposed 
conditional use outweigh the disadvantages. Anderson 
v. Peden, 569 P.2d 633, 637 (Ore. App. 1977). 
The Court then went on to discuss the standards to be 
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applied in reviewing a conditional use application. The 
Court stated: 
In theory, notification would ideally be 
accomplished by filling out all relevant standards 
in copius detail in the zoning ordinance. And 
it may be that passing on a conditional use appli-
cation in the total absence of standards would be 
improper. But the very nature of a conditional 
use in land use planning makes detailed and 
specific standards impossible. The granting or 
denial of a conditional use is a highly discre-
tionary act. Important and relevant considerations 
may vary from one neighborhood to another, and from 
one year to another. Id. at 6 38. 
Section 11-2-4.5 of the then existing Clearfield City 
Ordinances defined the standards to be utilized in determining 
whether a conditional use permit is granted. That ordinance 
states: 
The planning commission shall not authorize 
a conditional use permit unless evidence is 
presented to establish: 
(a) That the proposed use of the particular 
location is necessary or desirable to provide a 
service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the community, and; 
(b) That such use will not, under the cir-
cumstances of a particular case and the conditions 
imposed, be detrimental to the health, safety 
and general welfare of persons or injurious to 
property and improvements in the community, but 
will be compatible with and complimentary to the 
existing surrounding uses, buildings and structures 
when considering but not limited to, effect on 
adjacent property values, traffic, esthetics, 
pollution, parking, landscaping, location of 
structure on parcel and signs; 
(c) That the proposed use wil1 comply with 
the regulations and conditions specified in this 
ordinance for such use; and 
(d) That the proposed use conforms to the 
goals, policies, intent, and governinq principals 
of the Clearfield City Master Plan. 
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Again, a review of this conditional! use criteria shows 
that the City Council and its Planning Commission is 
authorized a great deal of discretion in deciding whether 
the advantages of a proposed facility outweigh its dis-
advantages. As will be seen in the following section while 
opinions can certainly differ as to the merits of placing 
this type of facility at the Smith house location there is 
ample justification for the Commission In deciding not to 
grant the application for the conditional use permit. Such 
decision was neither arbitrary, capricicpus or without basis 
of fact. 
C. The Decision of the Clearfield City Council 
and the Clearfield City Planning Commission 
to Deny a Conditional Use Permit to the 
Plaintiff was Based Upon Rational Reasons 
and Was Not, Arbitrary or Capricious. 
As noted earlier, in order to overturn the decision of the 
City Council the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the 
decision is without any rational basis, 
capricious. The lower court discounted 
given for denying the application and gave validity to all of 
the reasons presented by Plaintiff for 
do not dispute that a decision maker co 
and was arbitrary and 
all of the reasons 
granting it. Defendants 
Lid conclude a facilitv 
on the Smith property would be in the best interest of the 
community and that the conditional use 
However, as has been stated earlier thel 
is whether the decision of the City Council, as the legal 
decision maker in this case, was based 
justifiable basis. 
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permit should be granted, 
question in this appeal 
on a rational and 
A number of reasons were presented at the hearings and 
at the trial for denying this permit. Defendants submit that 
as long as any of these reasons either by themselves or in 
conjunction with others provide a rational basis for denial 
then the decision of the lower court must be reversed. There 
is no authority which states that an applicant is entitled 
to a conditional use permit unless there is a preponderance of 
evidence against him or a reasonable doubt in the minds of the 
decision makers. On the contrary, the decision making body is 
vested with a large amount of discretion and their decision 
will be affirmed as long as there is any basis to conclude 
that the decision was reasonable based upon the facts and 
circumstances presented. Brawner Building, Inc. v. Shehyn, 
442 F.2d 847 (B.C. Cir. 1971). 
Before proceeding to examine the reasons given for denial 
of this permit it is necessary to examine the use and the status 
this facility should be afforded. The proposed use according to 
Dr. Williams was to provide a transitional facility where 
patients could stay for 90 to 120 days in a treatment program 
before entering the community on an out-patient basis. Both 
juveniles and adults would be placed in this facility. These 
persons would have been recovering from an alcohol and drug 
dependency problem together with any other mental health 
problems they may have suffered as a result of these addictions. 
While Defendants certainly are sympathetic in helping 
victims of drug and alcohol abuse the perspective of this type 
of treatment center must be kept in mind. The state legislature 
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for example, has mandated that handicapped persons be allowed 
to reside in group homes in any residential zone which is 
not zoned exclusively for single-family dwellings. Section 
10-9-2,5, U.C.A. (See Appendix). The legislature specifically 
excluded, however, persons being treated "for alcoholism or 
drug abuse" from being placed "in a residential facility for 
handicapped persons." Thus, while peop]|e who have suffered 
from mental and physical handicaps such 
are given a special status by the state 
them to reside in areas regardless of ttie zoning ordinances of 
a municipality, such status has not been given the type of 
facility proposed in this case. Thus, the proposed facility 
does not have any special status which would entitle it to 
consideration beyond a normal applicant for group facilities. 
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 89 L.Ed.2d 
as mental retardation 
legislature which allows 
313 (1985) a local ordinance required that a special use permit 
be obtained for the establishment of a group home for the insane, 
feeble minded, alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional 
institutions. The court concluded that 
basis for including the "feeble minded" 
since there was no showing that this group of individuals 
were of any greater-danger or concern tp the community than 
were other groups of individuals which ^fere allowed to reside 
in areas without such permit. The court, however, did not state 
there was no rational 
in this classification 
that it was improper for the city to ma 
as to other groups including alcoholic 
Thus far the Utah Legislature has 
ke such classifications 
pr drug addicts. 
not given any special 
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privileges to homes established for the insane, for convicted 
felons, or for drug and alcoholic addicts• The Legislature 
has still allowed each community to decide where these group 
homes and halfway houses should be placed. While it is recog-
nized that a stigma will always be present when these facilities 
are proposed and that the local residents will undoubtedly be 
opposed to the placement of these type of facilities in their 
area, the Legislature has placed the discretion in deciding 
these questions with the local governing officials. 
In summary, therefore, cases which deal with group homes 
proposed for mental retardation, for the elderly, for unwanted 
children, etc. are not comparable to the facts of this case 
and must be carefully examined before any generalities are 
made. It may well be, for example, that in the future the 
Legislature will elect to afford drug and alcoholic addicts 
who are attempting rehabilitation the same status as a handi-
capped person has today and may require cities to permit such 
homes in all areas without condition. Until that time comes, 
however, the present applicant cannot be afforded any special 
advantages or presumptions. 
The lower court took the position that the City was 
required to prove the negative of any claim. For example, 
a review of the Findings indicates that the Court found that 
no "evidence of reduced property values was produced at the 
hearings" and that no studies were made and no professional 
real estate appraisers presented any negative opinion as to 
the property value question. (Findings Nos. 40 and 41). 
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itions listed in the 
of persuasion must 
The question then becomes was it the conjmunity1 s obligation 
to prove that property values would go down with the establish-
ment of this facility or, to the contrary, was it the obliga-
tion of the County to prove that property values would not go 
down? Since a conditional use permit requires a showing on 
the part of the applicant as to the cond] 
ordinance it is apparent that the burden 
be upon the applicant to negate any concerns and is not upon 
the City or the residents to prove to the contrary. The lower 
court throughout its findings consistently confuses the burden 
of persuasion in this type of hearing. 
Another misconception of the lower court is evidenced 
by the Memorandum Decision which states} 
Perhaps an ultimate question is whether Davis 
County Mental Health can pick the site or Clearfield 
City can pick the site. The site proposed in the 
application is the only one having]an existing 
facility. All other proposed sites require a 
building project. The answer is obvious. Davis 
County Mental Health has the right to pick their 
own site. Memorandum Decision at p. 6. 
The assumption of the lower court is again that the 
plaintiff has a right to establish a grpup home anywhere it 
choses in the city unless the City can produce a good reason 
for not allowing that site to be chosen 
only half correct. Since the City is vested with discretion 
it may decide, for example, not to allow any type of facility 
to be established for a specified number of years or in a 
specified area of the city. A city legitimately can decide, 
for example, that there is not a sufficient need for the 
This assumption is 
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establishment of a second hospital in the city limits even 
though the hospital would meet all of the necessary require-
ments. The same may be said for banks or boarding houses 
which are also listed as conditional uses under the PO zone. 
The City Council or Planning Commission, in other words, may 
decide that the proposed use of the location is not necessary 
or desirable in providing "a service or facility which will 
contribute to the general well-being of the community." 
11-2-4.5, Clearfield City Ordinances. The City may decide that 
it simply does not believe additional hospitals, banks, or 
group homes for alcoholics are needed to serve the community 
and therefore deny such application on that basis alone. Of 
course, there would have to be a rational basis for this 
decision and such denial could not be based merely on the 
dislike of the City Council for banking institutions, for 
example. 
With this standard in mind it is apparent that the 
Council and the Zoning Commission acted properly in deciding 
that the proposed facility should not be allowed at the 
Victor Smith residence. A number of factors combined to give 
the basis for this conclusion. Individually and collectively 
they provide the rational basis required to uphold the decision 
of the Council and Commission. 
First, there is no question that these type of a?^oholic 
and drug abuse centers create a stigma in the area in which 
they are being placed. The same is also true for halfway 
houses where prison inmates are allowed to reside. Whether 
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this stigma is justified or not is immaterial since the 
residents in that area perceive a danger which affects their 
quality of life. Mr. Don Baird who is certainly well qualified 
in city planning matters testified as to this phenomonen. In 
the following dialogue with plaintiff's counsel this concern 
was expressed by Mr. Baird: 
Q. Isn't it true that the perception of it being 
a double in size of mental health, alcohol rehab 
center, the perception of thaip is a key factor 
in quality of life? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Perception of a significant stigma that we talked 
about that mental health people are somehow different. 
A. No, I wouldn't say the stigmaL I would separate 
it from the stigma. I would say that the perception 
of that is there because whether or not that facility, 
existing or proposed or the two of them contribute to 
crime, contribute to the health or physical well-being 
or the detriment is completely irrelevant because the 
perception of the people who live around there is 
real. That's real to them. Whether or not there is 
ten crimes or zero crimes, the people who live around 
there have a particular perception of what might 
happen to them and that perception to them is very 
real and that becomes a part of their quality of life. 
If a little old lady who lives there says something 
like that makes me scared to death, that I have to 
lock my doors and windows and I am afraid to go out 
at night. Whether it's true or not, it certainly 
affects the quality of her lite. 
Q. Isn't that the heart of the problem that we are 
facing? That is, that the perception is that those 
who will be housed there are [going to hurt us someway; 
isn't that true? 
A. I would say that would be part of it. (Tr. 258-59). 
Plaintiff can argue that this perc 
proposed facility wherever it is placed 
may be true the question in this case i 
pption will follow a 
However, while that 
Is whether the residents 
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who live in the area of the Victor Smith house should be 
subjected to additional perceived danger over and above that 
which they saw in the existing ARC facility placed 
there since 19 81. In other words, was it fair to double the 
size of the perceived problem population in that area as to 
those residents or would it be more equitable to place this 
facility in another neighborhood thereby perhaps increasing 
fear in that area but reducing it around the present ARC facility. 
Such decision is certainly a discretionary call. 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon in Anderson v. Peden, 56 9 
P.2d 633, 640 (Ore. App. 1977) addressed the problem of allowing 
neighborhood input in deciding a conditional use permit. 
The Court stated: 
Aside from petitioner's choice of pejorative 
terms, we see nothing improper with the decision 
on a conditional use being based in part on the 
feelings of the neighbors who will have to live 
with that use, if approved. . . . In our system 
and tradition, political process means democratic 
process. Just as it is permissible and proper for 
local governments to consider public sentiment in 
establishing a legislative land use plan, it is 
permissible and proper for local governments to 
give such public sentiment such consideration as 
may be relevant under the circumstances in con-
sidering quasi-judicial changes in that plan. 
A second reason causing fears of those in the area 
relate to decline of property value. While the normal question 
is whether the placement of an alcohol-drug rehabilitation 
center will cause a decline in the values of properties ii. that 
area the question in this case was somewhat different. Since 
there was already one facility located in the area the question 
became what effect would a second facility have upon the existing 
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properties. Exhibit 18 entitled "The Effect of Group Care 
Facilities on Property Values" reports that the Oakland, 
California 198 3 study dealing with persdns with mental health, 
alcohol and drug problems did cause an impact on property 
values. Shirley Reed, one of the councilwomen with the City 
Council stated that the Wolch study of (Oakland, California 
also concluded that concentrating these type of facilities in 
one area has an even greater impact on property values. 
(Tr. 164, 175). 
The City Council had a legitimate concern with the question 
i 
of allowing two quite different facilities together. The existing 
facility known as the Addiction Recovery Center (ARC) involved 
adults being treated for chemical addiction. (Tr. 53). The 
new facility was to contain both adults and children experiencing 
substance abuse and mental illness. (Tr. 71). 
The District Court of Pennsylvania in Sullivan v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 617 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Pa. 1985) found that Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania had wrongfully excluded group homes for 
alcoholics throughout the city. Nevertheless, the court found 
that it was a legitimate requirement thpt such facilities could 
not be located within one-half mile of 
or one-quarter mile from an out-patientl 
clinic. Id. at 14 98. The Colorado Court of Appeals in Roundup 
Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment! 
1154 (Colo. App. 1981) upheld a provisi 
homes for developmentally disabled pers| 
feet of one another. 
Another group residence 
drug or alcoholics 
of Denver, 6 26 P.2d 
on which prohibited 
ons to be within 20 00 
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Again, Exhibit 18, the study conducted by the APA 
Planning Advisory Service also noted that spacing facilities 
within a community was a legitimate procedure. That source 
stated: 
Regarding the concentration of group care 
facilities in a community, residents fear that a 
single exception to restrictive regulations 
against these facilities, or allowing them as 
permitted uses, will attract other facilities to 
nearby locations. To avoid this problem, several 
communities use distance criteria to control 
clustering. . . . Alternative criteria may be the 
number of facilities per block, the number of 
residents per home, or the number of group care 
residents as a percentage of population. 
Finally, the Utah Legislature in enacting Section 17-27-11.7 
U.C.A. (Residential Facility For Handicapped Persons Permitted 
in County Zoning District) and 10-9-2.5 U.C.A. (Residential 
Facility for Handicapped Persons Permitted in Municipal 
Zoning Districts) both allow a city to establish a one-mile 
distance between existing facilities. 
The record is clear that neither the City Council nor 
the Planning Commission oppose the establishment of this type 
of facility within Clearfield City. While it is true that 
some of the various members and residents felt that Clearfield 
City had done its share of social service development there 
was no official position ever taken that these type of 
facilities would be banned in the future. 
The City Council on its own initiative requested Mr. Bair^ 
to locate sites which would be suitable for this type of 
facility but which would not impact on the present area of 
the ARC. The fact that two of these proposed sites have now 
-38-
been approved for social service facilities affirms the 
intention of the City in supporting these type of programs. 
Further, the amendment of the zoning ordinances to allow 
these facilities to be placed in any residential district 
throughout the city also negates any claim that the City is 
opposed to helping those who are addicted to alcoholic and 
drug substances. There is nothing to prevent the County 
from finding other existing residences throughout the City 
and applying for conditional use permitls. 
The clustering of two facilities together was therefore 
a justifiable concern on the part of the Council and the 
Commission. While the lower court could conclude that the map 
prepared by Mr. Baird in defining neighborhoods was arbitrary 
and that the conclusion of 11% of the tptal area in that neigh-
borhood being devoted to social services was incorrect, it 
was a proper function of the City to map-
of the effected area and certainly the 
court as to what area would encompass the surrounding neighbor-
hood would be no less arbitrary. The important point to 
remember, however, is not the arbitrariness of the decision 
but the fact that it was supported by a rational basis and was 
exercised in the discretion of the Planning Commission staff. 
A number of other reasons were stated by various parties 
in these proceedings as to why the facility should not be 
allowed at the Smith residence. The proximity to the junior 
high, for example, was a legitimate concern in view of the 
young ages of the proposed residents ofl the facility and in 
ke this determination 
decision of the trial 
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view of the drug trafficking which was occurring at the junior 
high. The Council certainly had the discretion regardless of 
the views of Dr. Williams to conclude that it was not in the 
general welfare of those students and patients to have the 
facility in such a close proximity. Other factors such as the 
cost of construction, the loss of tax base, and the crime rate 
were still legitimate concerns but apparently did not play a 
major part in the decision. 
The lower court seemed concerned that there were no 
written findings made by either the Planning Commision or 
the City Council. Neither state law nor city ordinances 
required such findings. The minutes of the various meetings 
constitute the record in these type of cases and are normally 
adequate to provide a basis for the decision. The Washington 
Appellate Court in noting a similar complaint about findings 
stated: 
There is no requirement in the zoning code that 
the city council must, on appeal, enter written findings 
of fact. We think the contention of appellants was 
effectively answered and disposed of in [a prior case] 
which said "There is no requirement in the zoning code 
of a written document, and the word 'findings' means 
nothing more than administrative determinations." 
This principle is, in our opinion, fully applicable 
here. When the council acted to grant Safewayfs appli-
cation, it determined that the "facts" necessary to the 
grant were present. The record itself is available to 
review whether or not such determination had a factual 
basis. Findings of fact on permits, licenses, and so 
forth would constitute an onerous burden upon already 
overburdened city councils. Morrison v. Seattle, 492 
P.2d 1078, 1085 (Wash. App. 1971). 
In conclusion, the lower court erred in finding that the 
decision of the City Council and the Zoning Commission was 
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arbitrary, capricious and without rational basis. While it 
certainly can be said that the arguments presented by the 
County in favor of the establishment of such a facility at 
the Smith residence are logical and sound it can also be said 
that the concerns voiced by various members of the public and 
by the members of the staff and governing bodies are also 
legitimate. Mr. Baird and Mr. Summerkojrn, both highly trained 
planning professionals, correctly identified the options 
available in this case when they informed the Commission and 
Council that they were justified in deciding either way. 
(Tr. 128, 223). As one court noted: 
Where there is room for two opinions, action 
is not arbitrary or capricious whep. exercised 
honestly and upon due consideratioh, even though 
it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion 
has been reached. Lillions v. Gibbs, 289 P.2d 203, 
205 (Wash. App. 1955). 
For these reasons, therefore, the decision of the City 
Council and Planning Commission must be| 
decision of the lower court reversed. 
reinstated and the 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING 
AND CLEARFIELD CITY COUNCIL UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
APPLIED SECTION 11 OF CHAPTER 12 OF THE CLEARFIELD 
ZONING ORDINANCES IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7 AND 
SECTION 24 OF ARTICLE I OF THE UTAH STATE CON-
STITUTION AND SECTION I OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
It is somewhat difficult to understand why the lower court 
entered its Conclusions of Law Nos. 3 dnd 7. In both instances 
the court stated that there was not a rational or reasonable 
basis for the denial of the applicatiorj for conditional use 
COMMISSION 
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permit by the Clearfield City Planning Commission and the 
Clearfield City Council and that both had unconstitutionally 
applied Section 11 of Chapter 12 of the Clearfield Zoning 
Ordinances in violation of Sections 7 and 24 of Article I of 
the Utah Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The memorandum decision written 
by the court in minute detail did not refer to these alleged 
constitutional violations. The court specifically found the 
Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance constitutional. (See page 1 
Memorandum Decision). 
Assuming that the lower court intended to make a consti-
tutional determination, the decision is still erroneous. First, 
the statutory zoning scheme in place during the time of this 
permit request as well as the present scheme of Clearfield 
City is not unconstitutional on its face. The conditional use 
requirement imposed upon plaintiff for their alcohol and drug 
rehabilitation facility is no different than the conditions 
imposed upon any conditional use in the city. Thus, this 
statute is unlike the Texas statute in the Cleburne Living 
Center case, supra, which specifically referred to the feeble 
minded, alcoholics, institutional prisoners, and the insane 
in requiring certain types of special zoning requirements. It 
is equally unlike the statute of Washington which set up a 
complete procedure for the establishment of group homes 
housing former mental patients. J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 
Washington, 720 F.2d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 1983). Even so, 
the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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by the governing 
permits and that 
held that a city could provide for special requirements of 
selected groups of individuals as long as there was a rational 
basis for such selection and that therefore equal protection 
was not violated by the ordinance itself. 
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in both cases, however, found tnat these valid statutes 
have been unconstitutionally applied. Both courts concluded 
that there was no rational reason given 
authority for the denial of the various 
they had utilized these special statutes to deny mentally 
retarded patients and former mental patfents the right to 
be housed in group homes. 
Again, this situation does not apply to the instant 
case. In the first place the Utah Legislature has not given 
alcohol and drug dependent patients any 
over other classes of persons as it has| 
and physically handicapped. No controlling Utah court has 
ever given these individuals special status requiring close 
scrutiny of regulations against them. The patients in these 
facilities are therefore not deemed to be a suspect classifi-
cation as is the case with ethnic, racial, gender, and other 
types of classification. 
Second, the City has certainly not!expressed any policy 
against helping this class of individuals as is evidenced by 
the establishment of the existing ARC facility. This is 
therefore unlike other cases in which cities have refused to 
grant any homes for certain classifications of persons or have 
special privileges 
done with the mentally 
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declared moritoriums as to future group homes of protected 
classifications of individuals. 
Had a bank been denied a conditional use permit to 
establish a branch next to an existing bank no claim of 
constitutional due process could be made. The facts of this 
case do not produce a different result. Merely because 
these particular individuals are undergoing drug and alcohol 
therapy does not give them a right to claim constitutional 
protection because of the denial of this type of facility. 
If this were the case than all mental health, drug, alcohol, 
and juvenile facilities could essentially write their own 
ticket as to any location that was desired within a municipality 
on the basis that to deny such usage would amount to a con-
stitutional deprivation. 
It would serve no purpose to review the rational basis 
utilized by the City governing bodies in denying this permit 
since the extensive discussion in the preceding section has 
adequately covered these contentions. The hours of testimony 
at public hearings together with the additional hours of numerous 
staff members of the City in investigating and reporting the 
pros and cons of locating this facility in the Smith home belie 
any claims of a due process violation. The City was completely 
justified in deciding that the impact of a second facility in 
this particular neighborhood was too great and that if a 
facility was to be established it would have to be at another 
location. The record in this case quite clearly shows that 
the decision was not based upon raw emotion but was based upon 
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a logical and rational consideration of all of the circum-
stances . 
Finally, the amendment of the present ordinances to 
allow these types of facilities throughout the city again 
refutes any claim of constitutional impropriety. The City 
and the citizens of Clearfield are clearly dedicated to 
helping these types of individuals to recover and to become 
useful citizens of the community. It is, however, the right 
of their elected officials to decide where such facilities 
will be located and under what conditions they will be 
established. It is not the role of the 
guess this process. 
judiciary to second 
Likewise, there is 
CONCLUSION 
For the preceding reasons the loweib court erred in 
determining that the decision of the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission and the Clearfield City Council was not based upon 
facts and was arbitrary and capricious 
no evidence to substantiate a conclusion that a constitutional 
violation occurred by this action. 
The decision of the lower court shcbuld be reversed and 
the decision of the Council and Commission reinstated, 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ . 
/ ,V/"\ 
M. 
/ \ W- / 
Craig S. ,Co<pk 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JUDGMENT 
CLEARFIELD CITY ZONING ORDINANCES 
SECTION FROM UTAH STATE CODE 
In the District Court of the Second Jujiicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of U^ah 
DAVIS COUNTY, 
Plaintiff,. 
vs. 
CLEARFIELD CITY, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 36431 
This case came before the Court for trial on April 24, 1986, 
with Gerald E. Hess appearing for the plaintiff, Davis County, 
Steven R. Bailey appearing for the plaintiff, Victor Smith, and 
Melvin C. Wilson appearing for the defendants, Clearfield City 
and Clearfield City Planning Commission. 
evidence and argument, the court took the ^ase under advisement 
The court now rules on the case. 
The court finds the actions of the Clearfield City Council 
and the Clearfield City Planning Commission in denying 
conditional use permit to Davis County 
transitional facility to be arbitrary and capricious and without 
substantial basis in fact. Also, there was no rational basis for 
the denial. Clearfield City is ordered to approve the 
conditional use permit. The court does not, however, find the 
Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance unconstitutional, 
orders each party to pay their own costs. 
Davis County, through its Department jof Mental Health made 
an application to Clearfield City on j{ine 25, 1984, for 
for mental 
a 
health 
The court 
conditional use permit for a mental health 
at 904 South State in Clearfield City. Clearfield City personnel 
aided Davis County in the preparation of 
transitional facility 
a proper application. 
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The Clearfield City Planning Commission held a public hearing on 
July 18, 1984. The hearing lasted about two and one-half hours. 
The Planning Commission denied the application. No findings of 
fact or conclusions of law were made. Several persons present at 
the meeting expressed their opinions as to the basis for ruling. 
None are acceptable or authorized by the Planning Commission, 
however. Davis County wrote a letter on July 30, 1984, asking 
Clearfield City for formal findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and decision so that it could intelligently respond to these 
matters on the appeal to the City Council. Clearfield City 
failed to furnish any. This court must, therefore, conclude that 
there was not a rational basis for such decision by the Planning 
Commission. 
The Clearfield City Council held public hearings on 
September 11, 1984, and October 9, 1984. The September 11 
meeting was a lengthy public meeting. All sides were given ample 
opportunity to present their views. The hearing was continued to 
October 9 so that research could be done on the application and 
so that a legal opinion could be obtained. 
The October 9 public meeting began at 7:15 P. M. It was a 
relatively short meeting. Councilwoman Shirley Reed made a 
motion almost at the beginning of the meeting to uphold the 
decision of the Planning Commission. The City Council had met in 
ostensibly a public meeting at 6:00 P. M. of the same evening 
without any outsiders being present and discussed the merits of 
the plaintiffs1 application. It in fact was not an open meeting. 
No minutes were taken of the meeting. The Council members 
obviously relied on information supplied in that meeting, 
however. This was evident from the statements made by them in 
the later meeting. 
No findings of fact, conclusions of law, or formal opinion 
came out of either the September 11 or October 9 meeting. 
Fortunately, the Davis County Mental Health tape recorded and 
transcribed both meetings verbatim. The court has read the 
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transcripts carefully. No where in the transcripts do I find 
believable information or evidence on which the Clearfield City 
Council could have rationally believed that the proposed mental 
health facility would pose any special| threat to Clearfield 
City's legitimate interests. 
There is no zone in Clearfield wherein the proposed facility 
could be located as a matter of right. Davis County had to rely 
on a conditional uste permit. Clearfield City's zoning ordinance 
changed just prior to the October 9, 1984, decision. Previous to 
the change 904 South State was locatled in a PO zone or 
professional office zone. This area had been changed from a 
residential zone to PO zone in about 1979. After the September 
1984 zone change it was known as a C-l zonje. 
The evidence at the public hearings 
zones are the preferable zones for 
proposed by plaintiffs. There is, howejver, a stigma that is 
still attached to mental health facilities. It is generally 
believed that somehow the location of 
residential zone will endanger the residents of the area and 
lower property values. Believable studies show that neither of 
these propositions is true. Nevertheless, both Clearfield City 
and other cities in Davis County have been very reluctant to 
approve such facilities in residential zones. In an effort to 
accommodate such feelings, the Davis County Mental Health has 
made application for such facilities in zones that are not 
strictly residential. Such is the case here. The PO zone or C-l 
zone would appear to be an acceptable alternative to the more 
desirable residential zones. 
The evidence at the public hearings show that the decision 
to deny was made because of public clampr. Indeed, there is 
almost uniform public clamor when any mental health facility, 
halfway house, jail or prison is proposedj. The public realizes 
the need for such facilities, but they should always be located 
somewhere else. The plaintiffs need in this case was to locate 
shows that residential 
the type of facility 
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in the North end of Davis County. This was to serve the needs of 
the citizens living in the North end of the County, although 
there would be persons from all parts of the County housed in the 
facility from time to time. Citizen opposition is a 
consideration which must be weighed, but cannot be the sole basis 
for the decision to deny. 
Two professional planners were involved in this case. 
Neither Wilford Summercorn, the Clearfield City Planner nor Wally 
Baird, the Clearfield City Manager could find any professional 
objection to the granting of the application. 
Some suggestion was made during the trial that Clearfield 
City was not doing its share to approve public service facilities 
within the City limits. Such a suggestion is absurd. Clearfield 
City has a great deal of public spirit and public responsibility. 
They are responsive to the needs of society. While occasionally 
disputes such as this arise, it does not take away from their 
willingness to promote the public good. 
Two areas of concern were put forth at the public hearings 
that deserve consideration. First was the idea that the proposed 
facility would create a danger or a nuisance because of its 
proximity to a junior high school, an alcohol rehabilitation 
center, and residents. Neither the Davis County School District 
nor the junior high administrators opposed the proposed facility. 
This was so even though it was public knowledge that the facility 
would house minors with drug problems and other mental health 
problems. The police department made a presentation at the 
hearings, but did not show that crime would increase in the area. 
There was some vague concern for possible future problems, but 
nothing concrete. The existence of the ARC just north of 904 
South State since 1981 had not created criminal problems in the 
area. No evidence showed any likelihood of increased social 
problems because this facility and the ARC would be adjacent to 
one another. 
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The second area of concern involved real estate values. 
Property owners expressed opinions that property values would go 
No professional real 
Icept for* the plaintiff, 
down. No studies were made however, 
estate appraisers gave their opinions, ex 
Victor Smith. His interest in the mattejr taints his testimony, 
but does not mean it should be disregarded. It was his opinion 
that the ARC had not impacted property yalues in the area and 
that the proposed facility would not. Sope possible uses of the 
new C-l zone, such as a restaurant <br garage or multiple 
apartment dwelling might lower property values, but not the 
proposed facility. No credible evidence of reduced property 
values was produced at the hearings. 
An argument was made that 11% of the land in a designated 
area would be devoted to public service jases if the application 
were granted. This 11% figure has n0 validity. The area 
included and excluded from the designated area was arbitrarily 
drawn. It did not include a separate neighborhood or the PO zone 
or any other area distinguishable on a reasonable basis 
the map used for the area, along with the 
from the map were discussed at the preplarjning meeting on October 
9, 1984, and not at the public hearing. Tjhe map was not used at 
the public meeting or explained to those present at the public 
meeting. 
An argument was made that Clearfield City did not want the 
proposed facility and the ARC adjacent to each other. No 
evidence was produced to show that any harm would come from the 
arrangement, except that the property would be taken off the tax 
producing rolls of Clearfield City. This ^as insufficient reason 
to justify a denial. 
An argument was made that there were four structured 
residential type facilities located withifi a radius of one mile 
of the proposed facility. The facts may be true but Clearfield 
City is only about 2.5 miles in diameter. After the application 
was denied, Clearfield City suggested five possible alternate 
Also, 
conclusions to be drawn 
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sites to Davis County. There was no guarantee that any of the 
five sites would be approved. Three of the five were near the 
hospital which is within Layton City limits. In that general 
vicinity there are seven or eight facilities including the 
hospital, two clinics, two doctors office buildings, a physical 
rehabilitation home, and an alcohol rehabilitation center. It 
appears that Clearfield City prefers to cluster these facilities 
into one area. There is nothing wrong with the clustering 
method, but in this case it does not meet the criteria for a 
residential transitional mental health facility, because of the 
lack of residential surroundings, bus transportation, schools, 
and churches. 
Perhaps an ultimate question is whether Davis County Mental 
Health can pick the site or Clearfield City can pick the site. 
The site proposed in the application is the only one having an 
existing facility. All other proposed sites require a building 
project. The answer is obvious. Davis County Mental Health has 
the right to pick their own site. If Clearfield City has a 
rational basis for denying the application, then its decision 
will be upheld. If reasons are given, but the reasons are 
specious or fail the reasonable person test, then the reasons 
will be disregarded. There must be substance to the reasons. 
A decision is said to be arbitrary when it is arrived at 
through will or caprice. A decision is capricious when it 
proceeds from whim or fancy. A decision is without basis in fact 
when it cannot be supported with rational facts and arguments. 
The decision of the Clearfield City Planning Commission and the 
Clearfield City Council was well intentioned, but falls into the 
above categories. 
The plaintiff, Davis County, is ordered to draw a formal 
opinion in conformity •'-o this decision. 
- 3 -
Dated May 7, 1986. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT,^ 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic 
of the State of Utah, and 
VICTOR SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLEARFIELD CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah and the 
CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 36431 
The above matter, having come on regularly for trial on 
April 24, 1986, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, one of 
the judges of the above-entitled court; Plaintiff Davis County 
being represented by Gerald E. Hess, Deputy Davis County 
Attorney, and Plaintiff Victor Smith being represented by Steven 
R. Bailey, and Defendants being represented by Melvin C. Wilson; 
and witnesses having been called and testimony having been taken 
and exhibits having been introduced, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Davis County, through its Department of Mental 
Health, made an application to Clearfield City on June 25, 1984 
V=\\J j\eO 
for a Conditional Use Permit for a Mental Health Transitional 
I 
Facility to be located at 904 South State in Clearfield, Utah. 
2. Davis County had obtained an earnest money 
agreement with Victor Smith for the purchase of the property 
located at 904 South State Street in Clearfield, Utah, subject to 
approval of the Conditional Use Permit by Clearfield City. 
3. Clearfield City personnel aided Davis County in the 
preparation of the application for a Conditional Use Permit. 
4. Pursuant to notice, the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission held a public hearing on July 18, 1984, to consider 
the application of Davis County, which hearjing lasted 
approximately 2 1/2 hours. 
5. No accurate written record of the Planning 
Commission Hearing was preserved, and no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law were made. 
6. The Planning Commission voted to deny the 
Conditional Use Permit Application of Davis County. 
7. Several persons present at thte meeting expressed 
their opinions as to the basis for the Planning Commission 
ruling, but no official or authorized reason for the ruling was 
ever stated by the Planning Commission. 
8. Clearfield City failed to furbish to Davis County 
any findings of fact, conclusions of law, of decision from the 
Clearfield City Planning Commission even though Davis County made 
written request for them. 
9. On July 26, 1984, Davis County filed with 
Clearfield City a formal appeal of the denial of the Conditional 
2 
Use Permit by the Clearfield City Planning Commission, which 
appeal was made to the Clearfield City Council in accordance with 
the Clearfield City Ordinances. 
10. The Clearfield City Council held public hearings on 
September 11, 1984, and thereafter on October 9, 1984, to 
consider the appeal of Davis County. 
11. The September 11, 1984, meeting was a lengthy public 
meeting where all sides were given ample opportunity to present 
their views. 
12. The hearing of September 11, 1984, was continued to 
October 9, 1984, at 7:15 p.m., so that research could be done on 
the application, and so that a legal opinion could be obtained. 
13. The October 9, 1984, continuation of the public 
hearing began at 7:15 p.m., and was a relatively short meeting. 
14. Councilwoman Shirley Reed made a motion almost at 
the beginning of the October 9, 1984, meeting to uphold the 
decision of the Planning Commission. 
15. The City Council had met in ostensibly a public 
meeting at 6:00 p.m. on October 9, 1986, without any outsiders 
being present or invited, and discussed the merits of the 
Application of Davis County. 
16. No minutes were taken of the portion of the City 
Council meeting which began at 6:00 p.m. on October 9, 1984. 
17. The City Council members relied on information 
supplied to them at the meeting which began at 6:00 p.m., and the 
information supplied to the City Council at the meeting which 
3 
began at 6:00 p.m. was not presented when tlhe public hearing 
commenced at 7:15 p.m. on October 9, 1984. 
18. No findings of fact, conclusions of law, or formal 
opinion came out of either the September 11, 
October 9, 1984, meeting. 
, 1984, meeting or the 
19. Although Clearfield City did not tape record or 
transcribe the proceedings of the public hearing, Davis County 
meetings verbatim, 
ievable information or 
Mental Health recorded and transcribed both 
and nowhere in the transcripts is there bel: 
evidence on which the Clearfield City Council could have 
rationally believed that the proposed Mental Health facility 
would pose any special threat to Clearfield} City's legitimate 
interest. 
20. There is no zone in Clearfielld City wherein the 
proposed facility could be located as a matter of right, and 
therefore, Plaintiff Davis County had to rely on a Conditional Use 
Permit in order to place a Mental Health facility in Clearfield 
City. 
21. Clearfield City's Zoning Ordijnance changed just 
prior to the October 9, 1984, public hearing. Previous to the 
change, 904 South State was located in a PO zone, or Professional 
Office zone. 
22. The area located at approximately 904 South State 
Street, Clearfield, Utah, had been a residential zone prior to 
1979, but was changed to a PO zone in approximately 1979. 
23. After the September 1984 zone 
property was included in a C-l zone. 
4 
change, the subject 
23. At the public hearings, evidence was presented to 
the effect that residential zones are the preferable zones for 
the type of facility proposed by Plaintiffs Davis County. 
24. Evidence presented at the public hearings 
demonstrates there is a stigma attached to Mental Health 
facilities, so that many who live in residential zones believe 
they will be endangered by persons who will be housed in the 
Mental Health facility, and also that the property values in the 
vicinity will be lowered. 
25. Presented at the public hearings were believable 
studies which show that residents of the Mental Health facility 
proposed will not endanger residents of the surrounding area, nor 
will the placement of a Mental Health facility lower property 
values in the area. 
26. Both Clearfield City and other cities in Davis 
County have been reluctant to approve Mental Health facilities in 
residential zones. In an effort to accommodate such feelings, the 
Davis County Mental Health has made application for such 
facilities in zones that are not strictly residential, such as 
the Professional Office zone in which the proposed facility is 
located. 
27. Placement of the Mental Health facility in the PO 
zone or C-l zone would appear to be an acceptable alternative to 
the more desirable residential zones. 
28. There was evidence presented at the public hearing 
that residents believed a Mental Health facility was a good idea, 
but not located near them. 
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29. The evidence at the public hearings show that the 
decision to deny was made because of public clamor. 
30. The Plaintiff's need as presented in the public 
hearing was to locate in the north end of Davis County, so as to 
serve the needs of the citizens living in tpe north end of Davis 
County. Although residents of Clearfield C^ty would be assisted 
at the Mental Health Center, persons from atl parts of the county 
would be housed in the facility from time tp time. 
31. Two professional planners involved in the public 
hearings could find no significant professional objection to the 
granting of the application. 
33. Some suggestion was made during the trial that 
Clearfield City was not doing its share to Approve public service 
facilities within the city limits; but the Evidence shows 
Clearfield City has a great deal of public ^pirit and public 
responsibility, and are responsive to the needs of society, 
although occasionally disputes do arise, but it is clear that 
Clearfield City desires to promote the public good. 
34. Some members of the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission and the Clearfield City Council expressed concern that 
placement of the Mental Health facility woup.d create a danger or 
nuisance because of its proximity to a junibr high school, an 
Alcohol Rehabilitation Center, and to residents. 
35. Neither the Davis County School District nor any 
representative from the adjacent junior high appeared at the 
public hearings to oppose the proposed facility. 
36. Dr. Russell Williams, Director of Davis County 
Mental Health, testified at the public hearings that placement of 
the Mental Health facility at the proposed location would not 
create any significant problems for residents of the facility, 
nor would residents of the facility create any danger or nuisance 
to students at the junior high school, Alcohol Rehabilitation 
residents, or local residents. 
37. The Clearfield City Police Department made a 
presentation at the hearings, but did not show that crime would 
increase in the area, although there was some vague concern 
expressed for possible future problems, but nothing concrete. 
38. The-existence of the ARC just north of 904 South 
State Street since 1981 had not created criminal problems in the 
area. 
39. No evidence presented to the Planning Commission 
showed any likelihood of increased social problems because this 
facility and the ARC would be adjacent to one another. 
40. No studies were made and no professional real 
estate appraisers presented any negative opinion to the hearings 
before the Planning Commission and the City Council, except for 
Plaintiff Victor Smith. His interest in the matter taints his 
testimony, but does not mean it should be disregarded. It was 
his opinion that the ARC had not impacted property values in the 
area, and that the proposed facility would not. Some possible 
uses of the new C-l zone such as a restaurant or garage or 
multiple apartment dwelling might lower property values, but not 
the proposed facility. 
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41. No evidence of reduced property values was produced 
at the hearings, except from persons who owned property in the 
area, and their concerns were based upon fear of what might 
happen, rather than upon any objective study. 
42. In the motion made by a Clearfield City 
Councilperson to deny the Conditional Use Permit, reference was 
made to the fact that eleven percent of land in a designated area 
would be devoted to public service uses if|the application were 
granted. This eleven percent figure has no validity. The area 
included and excluded from the designated area was arbitrarily 
drawn. It did not include a separate neighborhood or the PO zone 
or any other area distinguishable on a reasonable basis. Also, 
the map used for the area, along with the conclusions to be drawn 
from the map were discussed at the preplanning meeting on October 
9, 1984, and not at the public hearing. Tike map was not used at 
the public meeting or explained to those present at the public 
meeting. 
43. No evidence was produced at the public hearing to 
show that any harm would come from the proposed facility being 
located adjacent to the present ARC, except that the property 
would be taken off the tax producing rolls of Clearfield City. 
44. Members of the Clearfield City Council indicated 
one reason for denial of the proposed facility was that there 
were four structured residential type facilities located within a 
radius of one mile of the proposed facility. 
45. Clearfield City is only about 2.5 miles in 
diameter. 
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46, After the Clearfield City Council denied the 
application, the city suggested five possible alternate sites to 
Davis County, but there was no guarantee that any of the five 
sites would be approved as a Conditional Use, either by the 
Clearfield City Planning Commission, or the Clearfield City 
Council. Three of the five sites were near the hospital which is 
within Layton City, 
47. Clearfield City requested and received from Davis 
County a great deal of information related to the economic 
feasibility of acquiring the Vic Smith property and transforming 
it into a Mental Health facility. 
48- Any of the sites recommended by Clearfield City 
were vacant properties and buildings would have been required to 
be constructed on the various sites. 
49. One Clearfield City Councilman who visited the ARC 
facility expressed fear and apprehension as he entered the 
facility, but after he had learned about the kind of people 
receiving treatment in the facility and the various treatment 
programs, his fear of the facility vanished. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCISIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff has no plain and adequate remedy at law. 
2. Plaintiff Davis County has exhausted its 
administrative remedies. 
3. There was not a rational or reasonable basis for 
denial of the Application for Conditional Use Permit by the 
9 
Clearfield City Planning Commission, in that the Clearfield City 
Planning Commission unconstitionally applied Section 11 of 
Chapter 12 of the Clearfield Zoning Ordinance in violation of 
Section 7 and Section 24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution 
and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
4. The City Council meeting which commenced on October 
9, 1984, at 6:00 p.m. was not an open meeting, as required by the 
statutes of the State of Utah. 
5. Citizen opposition to the proposed Mental Health 
facility must be weighed, but cannot be the sole basis for the 
decision to deny the Conditional Use Permit. 
6. The actions of the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission and the Clearfield City Council in denying a 
Conditional Use"Permit to Plaintiff Davis County for a Mental 
Health Transitional Facility was arbitrary|and capricious and 
discriminatory and without substantial basis in fact. 
7. There was no rational or reasonable basis for 
defendant Clearfield City Council to deny the Conditional Use 
Permit to Davis County, in that the Clearfield City Council 
unconstitutionally applied Section 11 of Chapter 12 of the 
Clearfield Zoning Ordinance in violation of Section 7 and Section 
24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution and of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
8. The Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance, in effect on 
June 25, 1984, and as thereafter amended, is not 
unconstitutional. 
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9. A Writ of Mandamus should be issued ordering and 
requiring the Clearfield City Planning Commission and the 
Clearfield City Council to approve the Conditional Use Permit 
Application of Plaintiff Davis County, and issue a Conditional 
Use Permit to Davis County, thereby authorizing Davis County to 
operate a Mental Health Transitional Treatment facility at 904 
South State Street, Clearfield, Utah. 
10. Each party should be required to bear its own costs 
and attorney's fees. 
DATED this ,^$ day of May, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to: 
Melvin C. Wilson 
Attorney at Law 
133 South State Street, Suite 203 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
and ~ 
Steven R. Bailey 
Attorney at Law 
2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 2 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
w4th -pootage- prepaid thereon, this day of May, 1986. 
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LOREN D. MARTIN 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse Building 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND 
FILED IN CI.D1K-S 0?r'Cr 
0AV!SC:.HIY.ij7Ah 
1385 HAY 28 PHI? 19 
M.CHAEL G A'.LPH.'N.CLEnK 
2ND CiSTRlCf CCl'RT 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT ^ 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic 
of the State of Utah, and 
VICTOR SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
CLEARFIELD CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah and the 
CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND 
WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
CiJil No. 36431 
The above matter, having come on 
April 24, 1986, before the Honorable Dougi 
the judges of*the above-entitled court; PI 
being represented by Gerald E. Hess, Deputy Davis County 
Attorney, and Plaintiff Victor Smith beind represented by Steven 
R. Bailey, and Defendants being represented by Melvin C. Wilson; 
and witnesses having been called and testimony having been taken 
and exhibits having been introduced, and tpe Court having made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and conclusions of law; 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and 
decreed as follows: 
regularly for trial on 
as L. Cornaby, one of 
aintiff Davis County 
1. The Clearfield City Planning Commission and the 
Clearfield City Council are hereby ordered to approve the 
Conditional Use Permit Application of Plaintiff Davis County, and 
to issue a Conditional Use Permit to Plaintiff Davis County, 
thereby allowing and authorizing Davis County to operate a Mental 
Health Transitional Treatment Facility at the address commonly 
known as 904 South State Street, Clearfield, Utah. 
2. The Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance in effect on 
June 25, 1984, and subsequently amended is constitutional, and 
the request of Plaintiff Davis County to declare the ordinance 
unconstitutional is hereby denied with prejudice. 
3. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's 
fees. 
DATED this ^ / day of May, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL OyALLP!-: . r : , CLZRK 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I sailed a t}rue and correct copy 
of the foregoing Judgment and Writ of Mandamus to: 
Melvin C. Wilson 
Attorney at Law 
133 South State Street/ Suite 203 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
and 
Steven R. Bailey 
Attorney at Law 
2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 2 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
with poGtago prepaid thereon, this /f) ddy of May, 1986. 
:JELVIN C. WILSON 
Attorney at Law 
133 South State, Suite 203 
Clearfield, Utah 34015 
Telephone: 773-1440 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUFT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic of the 
State of Utah, and VICTOR SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLEARFIELD CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Utah 
and the 
CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 1-3643J 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant-Affellants, CLEARFIELD CITY, a 
Municipal Corporation of the State of Utah, and CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING 
CQt-IMISSICN, by and thru their attorney, MELVIN C. WILSON, hereby appeal frcn 
the judgment entered by the Court en May 28, 1986, in the above-entitled razt 
to the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this g*3r- day of June, 1986. 
MELVIN i . WILSON 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellants 
CERTIFICATION OF MAILTSG 
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the forecoing 
Jtotice of Appeal to GERALD C. HESS, Chief Civil Deputy, Davis County Attorney's 
Office, Courthouse, Famington, Utah 34025, and STEVEN R. BAILEY, Attorney at 
Law, 2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 2, Ogden, Utah 34401, postace prepaid this 
C!l * •"=D 
-2-
^3 ~ day of June, 1986. 
v U,\ Q-(oUt i^''-<-i-/-xm.M.-S-T\ 
Brooke Robinson 
Legal Secretary to MELVIN C WILSON 
Chapter 12 
P-0 PROFESSIONAL OFFICE ZONE 
Sections: 
11-12-1 Purpose and Objectives 
11-12-2 Permitted Uses 
11-12-3 Lot Area 
11-12-4 Lot Width 
11-12-5 Lot Frontage 
11-12-6 Prior Created Lots 
11-12-7 Lot Area Per Dwelling 
11-12-3 Yard Requirements 
11-12-9 Projections into Yard 
11-12-10 Building Height 
11-12-11 Distance Between Buildings 
11-12-12 Permissible Lot Coverage 
11-12-13 Parking, Loading and Access 
11-12-14 Site Plan Approval 
11-12-15 Other Requirements 
11-12-1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES. The Professional Office 
(P-O) Zone is established to provide areas in close proximity to 
the Central Business District, hospitals, business areas, and 
along arterials or major collector streets which will accommodate 
mixed multi-family residential uses and offices or laboratories 
for professional persons and related uses. This zone should not 
be established in a "strip" zoning manner along major streets, but 
should be concentrated to provide easy accessibility to the public. 
The zone is intended to provide availability of professional services 
conveniently to all neighborhoods in the community. 
Uses permitted in the P-0 Zone would typically include medium 
density apartments, offices for doctors, dentists, accountants, 
and other similar professions, medical, and dental laboratories, 
and pharmacies. 
11-12-2 PERMITTED USES. Those uses or categories of uses 
as listed herein, and no others, are permitted in the P-0 Zone. 
All uses listed herein are listed by number as designated in 
the Standard Land Use Code published and maintained by the Building 
and Zoning Department. Specific uses are identified by a four-
digit number in which all digits are whole numbers. Classes or 
groupings of such uses permitted in the zone are identified b^ a 
four-digit number in which the last one or two digits are zeros. 
All such categories listed herein, and all specific uses contained 
within them in the Standard Land Use Code, will be permitted in the 
P-0 Zone subject to the limitations set forth herein. 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
A. Permitted Principal Uses, The following principal 
uses and structures, and no others, are permitted in the 
P-0 Zone: 
USE NO, 
1141 
4800 
6311 
6320 
6330 
6340 
6350 
6360 
6390 
6500 
6710 
6900 
5912 
USE CLASSFICIATIONS 
Utilities (Lines and 
(Except 4850) 
Apartment (Low-rise, detached) (constructed 
to the standards of RJ-3 Zone provisions) 
rights-of-way only) 
Advertising Servicesi (Office only) 
Consumer Credit Services 
Duplicating, Stenographic and Office Services 
Dwelling, Janitorial 
Services (Office only) 
News Syndicate Servi 
Employment Services 
Miscellaneous Businel 
Professional Service 
and Other Building 
ces (Office Only) 
ss Services (Office only) 
s (Office only - no 
lodging or bed facilities) 
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Offices 
Miscelleneous Service Organizations (Office 
only) 
Prescription Pharma :y (Intended for the 
convenience of permitted establishments 
and/or clients thereof, provided that no 
such business occup 
of the total floor 
ies more than 15 percent 
area of the building 
in which it is locajted and has no separate 
street entrance.) 
B. Permitted Accessory Uses, Accessory uses and structures 
are permitted in the P-0 Zone, provideq they are incidental 
to, and do not substantially alter the 
permitted principal use or structure. 
uses and structures include, but are nc^ t limited to, the 
following: 
character of the 
Such permitted accessory 
1. Accessory buildings such as garages, carports, 
greenhouses, bath houses, gardening shed, recreation 
rooms, and similar structures which are customarily 
used in conjection with and are incidental to 
principal uses and structures allowed in the P-0 Zone, 
2. Swimming pools and incidental bath houses. 
3. Storage of materials used for the construction of a 
building including a temporary contractor's office 
and/or tool shed, provided that such uses are on the 
building site or immediately adjacent thereto, and 
provided that such use shall be for only the period of 
construction and thirty (30) days thereafter. 
4. Household pets in residential dwelling units/ provided 
there shall be no more than one (1) pet over the age 
of four (4) months per dwelling unit. Nothing herein 
shall be construed as authorizing the keeping of any 
animals capable of inflicting harm or discomfort or 
endangering the health and safety of any person or 
property. 
C. Conditional Uses. The following uses and structures are 
permitted in the P-0 Zone only after a Conditional Use Permit 
has been approved by the Planning Commission, and subject to 
the terms and conditions thereof. 
USE NO. USE CLASSIFICATION 
1210 Rooming and Boarding Houses 
1211 Baching Apartments (in structures devotee 
exclusively to that use) (Six (6) tenants 
per unit maximum to standards of R-4 Zom 
4700 Communications 
4800 Utilities (except lines and rights-of-wa^ 
6111 Banking and Related Functions 
6513 Hospitals 
6516 Sanitariums, ^ Convalescent, and Rest Home 
' Services ~" * ~ * w^^pL^~ 
11-12-3 LOT AREA. The minimum lot area of any lot or parce 
land in the P-0 Zone shall be seven thousand (7,000) square fe 
11-12-4 LOT WIDTH. Each lot or parcel of land in the P-0 
e shall have a width of not less than seventy (70) feet. 
11-12-5 LOT FRONTAGE. Each lot or parcel of land in the 
Zone shall abut a public street for a minimum distance of 
ty (50) feet, on a line parallel to the center line of a stree 
Chapter 2 
ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURES 
Sections: 
11-2-1 Hearings - Notice and Procedure 
11-2-2 Amendment - Procedure 
11-2-3 Variances - Procedure 
11-2-4 Conditional Use Permit - Procedure 
11-2-5 Appeals 
11-2-6 Annexed Territory - Zoning 
11-2-1 HEARINGS - NOTICE AND PROCEDURE. Notices of Public 
Hearings required by this Title before the 
the Planning Commission, or the City Council 
least fifteen (15) calendar days before the 
hereinafter set forth. Such notice shall s 
of such hearings and shall include a general! 
matter to be considered and a general descri) 
affected. 
B^ard of Adjustment, 
shall be given at 
Hearing in a manner 
t|ate the time and place 
explanation of the 
ption of the area 
A. If the matter is before the Boarc} of Adjustment, the 
Planning Commission, or the City Courjcil, the notice shall 
be published at least once in a news] 
culation within Clearfield City. 
aper of general cir-
B. If the matter is before the Board of Adjustment or the 
Planning Commission, The City shall, in addition to the above 
notice by publication, mail or otherwise deliver a notice to 
each owner of property within a radius of three hundred (300) 
feet of the exterior boundaries of the subject property, in-
cluding any property owner(s) outsidi the corporate limits of 
Clearfield City. Such notice shall be headed "NOTICE OF 
PUBLIC HEARING," and shall briefly describe the property 
involved and the changes, permits, or variances requested. 
It shall also state the place, date and time of the hearing. 
The list of property owners within t 
shall be taken from the latest asses 
the County Assessor of Davis County. 
11-2-2 AMENDMENT PROCEDURE. This 
hree hundred (300) feet 
pent rolls prepared by 
Zoning Title, including 
after said amendments ne map, may be amended by the City Council 
shall have first been submitted for recommendation to the Planning 
Commission. The recommendation of the Planjning Commission shall be 
submitted ID the City Council within thirty 
presentation of the rezoning proposal or pe 
regularLy scheduled Planning Commission Me a 
For the purpose of establishing and 
and desirable development within the City, 
public policy that amendments shall not be 
(30) days after the 
tition for amendment at a 
ting. 
maintaining sound, stable, 
it is declared to be the 
made to the Zoning Title, 
and Map, except to promote more fully the objectives and purposes 
of this Title or to correct manifest errors. Any person seeking 
an amendment to the Planning and Zoning Title or Map shall submit 
to the Building and Zoning Department a written petition containing 
the following information: 
A. Designation of the specific zone change or Title 
amendment desired. 
B. The reason and justification for such zone change or Title 
amendment, and a statement setting forth the manner in which 
a proposed amendment or Zone would further promote the 
objectives and purposes of the Zoning Title. 
C. A complete and accurate legal description of the area 
proposed to be rezoned, or a draft of the proposed Title 
amendment. 
D. An accurate plat, drawn to scale, showing all areas to be 
included within the proposed rezoning, designating the present 
zoning of the property subject of the petition, and properties 
immediately adjacent thereto. 
E. A list of all property owners within a radius of three 
hundred (300) feet of the boundaries of the property to be 
rezoned, as taken from the latest assessment rolls prepared 
by the County Assessor of Davis County. 
F. A filing fee of $50.00. 
Upon receipt of petition by the Building and Zoning Department, 
a copy shall be submitted to the office of the City Recorder for 
filing, and a copy with all accompanying materials shall be fore-
warded to the City Planning Commission for their consideration of 
the request. The Planning Commission shall hold a public hearing 
in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1 of this Chapter 
before submitting their recommendations to the City Council. 
Before recommending an amendment to this Title, it must be 
shown that such amendment is necessary, is in the interest of the 
public, and is in harmony with objectives and purposes of this 
Title. Failure on the part of the Planning Commission to make 
recommendation to the City Council within thirty (30) days after 
hearing the petition shall be deemed to constitute approval of 
such proposed amendments. 
The fee provided herein shall not be returnable and shall be 
applied to the General Fund to offset the cost of legal publications 
notification of property owners, and the staff time involved in 
researching the appropriateness of said request and its effect upon 
the general welfare of the community. 
11-2-3 VARIANCES - PROCEDURE. The B 
authorize, upon appeal, such variances frop\ 
as will not be contrary to the public inte 
special conditions the literal enforcement 
this Title will result in unnecessary hard|sh 
spirit of the Ordinance shall be observed 
done. Before any variance may be authorise 
shown that: 
>^ard of Adjustment may 
the terms of this Title 
rest, where owing to the 
of the provisions of 
ip; provided, that the 
and substantial justice 
d however, it shall be 
A. The variance will not substantially affect the comprehensiv< 
plan of zoning in the City and that qdherence to the strict 
letter of the Ordinance will cause difficulties and hardships, 
the imposition of which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in 
order to carry out the general purpose of the plan. 
B. Special circumstances attached to 
the application which do not generally 
perties in the same district. 
C. That because of special circumstances, property covered 
by this application is deprived of privileges possessed by 
other properties in the same district; and that the granting 
of the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial 
property right possessed by other property in the same district 
the property covered by 
apply to other pro-
Applications for variance shall be f 
of the Board of Adjustment in the office 
Department. Said application shall conta 
led with the Secretary 
<£>f the Building and Zoning 
in the following informatio 
A. A description of the requested v& 
designation of that Ordinance Provis 
being requested. 
riance, togther with a 
on from which relief is 
B. An accurate plot plan, if appropriate, indicating the 
manner in which the variance will be applied and its effect 
upon adjacent properties. 
C. A filing fee of $50.00. 
D. A list of property owners withinl three hundred (300) feet 
of any property subject of the requested variance, contained 
within the latest assessment rolls prepared by the County 
Assessor of Davis County. ' 
Upon receipt of application by the S 
Adjustment, a copy shall be submitted to 
Recorder for filing, and a copy with all 
pcretary of the Board of 
the office of the City 
[accompanying materials 
shall be forwarded to the Board of Adjustment for their action upon 
the request. The Board of Adjustment shall hold a public hearing 
in accordance with procedures set forth i|n Section 11-2-1 of this 
Chapter. 
11-2-4: CONDITIONAL USES, 
11-2-4.1: PURPOSE AND INTENT. The purpose and intent of conditional uses 
is to allow in certain areas compatible integration of uses which 
are related to the permitted uses of the zone, but which may be suitable and 
desirable only in certain locations in that zone due to conditions and circum-
stances peculiar to that location and/or upon certain conditions which make 
the uses suitable and/or only if such uses are designed, laid out, and const-
ructed on the proposed site in a particular manner. 
11-2-4.2: CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. A Conditional Use Permit shall be required 
for all uses listed as conditional uses in the zone regulations. 
A Conditional Use Permit may be revoked by the City Council after review and 
recommendation by the Planning Commission, upon failure to comply with the 
conditions imposed with the original approval of the permit. 
11-2-4.3: REVIEW PROCEDURE. 
A. Application for a Conditional Use Permit shall be made to the 
City Planning Commission accompanied by a filing of $25.00 which fee shall be 
non-refundable. 
B. Detailed location, site and building plans, the name and address 
of all property owners within a three-hundred (300) foot radius of boundaries 
of the property shall accompany the complete application on a form provided by 
the City. 
C. All pertinent information shall be mailed to all property 
owners within the three-hundred (300) foot radius of the subject property before 
review by the Planning Commission. The application together with all pertinent 
information will be considered by the Planning Commission at its next regularly 
scheduled meeting. 
D. The Planning Commission may call a specific Public Hearing on 
any application after adequate notice if it is deemed in the public interest, 
in which case, the Planning Commission shall take action on the application 
by the second meeting of the Planning Commission, after the application filing 
date. 
11-2-4.4: DETERMINATION. The Planning Commission may deny orpermit a 
conditional use to_ be 1 ocated_wi thin^ anyl'zqne -in .wfr Jcfi the particula 
co^itional.ui^ IaTauthc^izing^ny.xoadjtional..use, the Planning 
Commissiqn_jshall impose juch requirements and conditions necessary for the 
Projte&tJoa^O-fladgacent~JI£Q^ fare!."' 
11-2-4.5: BASIS FOR ISSUANCE OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. The Planning Commissi 
shall not authorize a Conditional Use Permit unless evidence is 
presented to establish: 
A. That thp proposed use. of .th,e, partloilftt^JL^ 4ry 
or desirable to provide a service nr facility whirh will rontrihntP to the 
general well-beingof the community^ and; 
An Ordinance to Amend the Revised Ordinances of Clearfield City, 11-2-4-3. 
Adopted by the City Council, September 22, 1981. 
2 
An Ordinance Amending the Revised Ordinances of Clearfield City, 11-2-4-3. 
Adopted by the City Council, September 22, 1981. 
B. That such use will not, under the circumstances of the 
particular case and the conditions imposed, be detrimental 
to the health, safety and general welfare of persons or 
injurious to property and improvement^ in the community, 
but will be compatible with and complimentary to the ..existing 
surrounding uses, buildings and structures when considering 
psi-hpt-irs, pollution, parKihqr landsgapJlnqiifM^oca^ion pf 
stmrl-nrp on prirrpl snfl Tigris, 
C. That the proposed use will comply with the regulations 
and conditions specified in this Ordinance for such use, and 
D. That the proposed use conforms to the goals, policies, 
intent and governing principles of th£ Clearfield City Master 
Plan. 
11-2-4-6 MJPO 
thl 
CONDITIONS WHICH MAY BE I P SED INCIDENT TO GRANTING 
OF A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. Where s Title contains 
specific requirements which must be met as an incident of Conditional 
Use Permit issuance, all such conditions must be met or adequate 
assurance of compliance must be given to the local jurisdiction 
prior to the issuance of such permit. 
Where no specific requirements are contained in this Title 
for the issuance of a Conditional Use Permit, one or more of the 
following requirements or limitations may jbe imposed by the Plannninc 
Commission as an incident to issuance of such permit. 
A. Landscaping to insure compatibility with the intended 
characteristics of the district as outlined in this Ordinance. 
B. Increased setback and side yard distances from lot lines 
may be necessary to insure the publicp safety and to insure 
compatibility with the intended characteristics of the district 
as outlined in this Title. 
C. The screening of yards or other preas as protection from 
obnoxious land uses and activities. 
D. The removal of structures, debri 
ble with the intended characteristic! 
in this Ordinance. 
s, or plant life, incompati 
s of the district outlined 
E. The relocation, covering or fenqing of irrigation ditches, 
drainage channels, and similar potential attractive nuisances 
as determined by the Planning Commission. 
F. The relocation of proposed or existing structures as 
necessary to provide for future streets on the major street pl< 
of the local jurisdiction, adequate I sight distances for genera 
safety, ground water control, or similar problems, 
G. Construction of water mains, sewer mains, and drainage 
facilities serving the proposed use, in sizes necessary to 
protect existing utility users in the district and to provide 
for an orderly development of land in the local jurisdiction, 
H. The location, arrangement, and dimensions of truck loading 
and unloading facilities. 
I. The number, location, color, size, height, lighting, and 
landscaping of outdoor advertising signs and structures in 
relation to the creation of traffic hazards and"appearance 
and harmony with adjacent development. 
J. The location, height, and materials of walls, fences, 
hedges, and screen plantings to insure harmony with adjacent 
development, or to conceal storage areas, utility installations 
or other unsightly development. 
K. The planting of ground cover or other surfacing to 
prevent dust and erosion. 
L. The retention of existing healthy trees and vegetation, 
M. Construction of curbs, gutters, drainage culverts, 
sidewalks, streets, fire hydrants, and street lighting which 
serve the property in question and which may compensate in 
part or in whole for possible adverse impacts to the district 
from the proposed conditional use. 
N. Restructuring of the land and planting of the same as 
directed by the Planning Commission when the conditional use 
involves cutting and/or filling the land and where such land 
would be adversely affected if not restructured. 
0. Time limits on the validity of the Conditional Use Permit. 
P. A bond or other valuable assurance in favor of the local 
jurisdiction in an amount to be determined by the governing 
body. The amount of said bond or other valuable assurance shall 
not exceed the amount calculated by the developer's engineer 
.and approved by the local engineer as necessary to assure 
compliance with all conditions. 
Q. Specific short and long range plans of development. 
R. Certification obtained and furnished by the applicant 
indicating that the proposed conditional u£e will meet and 
comply with standards set by the Envi 
Agency and by the Occupational Safety 
rjonmental Protection 
and Health Administration, 
S. Limitations and/or restrictions on the use and/or location 
of uses due to special site conditions including but not 
limited to geologically hazardous are^s; flood plains; 
fault zones; land slide areas; and sensitive areas due to 
soil capabilities, wildlife and plant life. 
T. Population density and intensity <bf land uses may be 
limited where land capability and/or vicinity relationships 
make it appropriate to do so to protect health, safety and 
welfare. 
U, Provision for or construction of recreational facilities 
necessary to satisfy needs of the con itional use. 
V. Finish floor elevations and grading plans to prevent or 
minimize water damage from flood leve| 
hydrology studies. 
W. A public hearing when deemed by the Planning Commission 
Is as determined by 
to be in the public interest. Howeve r, in the following 
instances the holding of a public hearing shall be mandatory: 
(1) The Planning Commission determines that existing 
streets and thoroughfares are not suitable and adequate 
to carry anticipated traffic, and increased densities 
resulting from the proposed use'may generate traffic in 
such amounts as to overload theistreet network outside 
the district. 
(2) The Planning Commission determines that increases 
in miscellaneous traffic, light, odor, and environmental 
pollution generated by the proposed use may significantly 
change the intended characteris 
outlined in this Ordinance. 
tics of the district as 
(3) The Planning Commission determines that the archi-
tectural design of the proposedj use varies significantly 
from the architectural characteristics of the district 
(as outlined in this Ordinance)! in which such use is 
proposed. 
(4) There are no specific requirements for the 
conditional use in this Ordinance 
X. Any other reasonable condition vfhich will serve to 
maintain the intended characteristics of a district as outline* 
in this Ordinance and to compensate for possible adverse 
impacts to the district from the proposed conditional use. 
11-2-4-7. APPEAL, Any person shall have the right to appeal 
to the City Council any decision rendered by the Planning Commission 
by filing, in writing and in triplicate, the reasons for said 
appeal with said City Council at any regular meeting thereof within 
fifteen (15) days following the date upon which the decision from 
which appeal is being taken is made by the Planning Commission. 
A. Notification of Planning Commission. The City Council 
shall notify the Planning Commission of the date of said 
review in writing at least seven (7) days preceeding said 
date set for hearing so that said Planning Commission may 
prepare the record for said hearing, 
B. Determination of City Council. The City Council, after 
proper review of the decision of the Planning Commission, may 
affirm, reverse, alter or remand for further review and con-
sideration any action taken by said Planning Commission and 
shall make such decision within thirty (30) days of the hearing 
of the appeal. 
11-2-4-8. BUILDING PERMIT. Following the issuance of a 
Conditional Use Permit, the Building Inspector shall review the 
permit and the conditions attached. Based on this review and 
compliance with any other items that might develop in the pursuance 
of his duties, the Building Inspector any approve an application 
for a Building Permit and shall insure that development is undertaken 
and completed in compliance with said Conditional Use Permit and 
Building Permit. 
11-2-4-9. EXPIRATION. Unless there is substantial action 
under a Conditional Use Permit within a period of one year of its 
issuance, the Conditional Use Permit shall expire. The Planning 
Commission may grant a single extension not to exceed six months 
under exceptional circumstances. 
11-2-4-10. MODIFICATION OR REVOCATION OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT 
The City Council, on its own motion or by recommendation of 
the Planning Commission, may hold a hearing upon the question of 
modification or revocation of a Conditional Use Permite granted under 
or pursuant to the provisions of this section. Notice of said hear-
ing shall be made in a manner prescribed by Section 11-2-1 of this 
Chapter. A Conditional Use Permit may be modified or revoked if the 
City Council finds one or more of the following: 
1. That the use is detrimental to the public health, safety, 
or welfare or is a nuisance. 
o That the use permit: was obtained by fraud. 
3. That the use 
being exercised. 
for which the permit was granted is not 
4. That the use for which the use permit was granted has 
ceased or has been suspended for six (6) months. 
5. That the 'conditions imposed upon said use permit have 
not been complied with. 
6. That there is a violation of other laws or ordinances 
of the City which have a direct bearing upon the conduct of 
the conditional use and/or its comparability with other 
surrounding uses. 
11-2-5 APPEALS. Appeals from actions or decisions of 
Clearfield City Officers, Officials, or Advisory Agencies may be 
made in conformance with the following provisions: 
A. Appeals to the Board of Adjustment. Appeals to the Board 
of Adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved or by any 
Officer, Department, Board of Bureau of Municipality affected 
by any decision by the Administrative Officer. Such appeal 
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days of said action or 
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Officer from 
whom the appeal is taken or with the Board of Adjustment. 
Said Notice of Appeal shall specify the grounds of the 
appeal and circumstances related thereto. The Officer from 
whom the appeal was taken shall forthwith transmit to the 
Board of Adjustment all papers constituting the record upon 
which the action appealed from was taken. 
(Ref. Appeals to Board 10-9-9 U.C.A., 1953) 
An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action 
appealed from unless the Officer from whom the appeal is taken 
certifies to the Board of Adjustment after the Notice of Appea." 
shall have been filed with him that by reason of facts stated 
in the Certificate a stay would, in his opinion, cause imminen' 
peril to life or property. In such case, proceedings shall no 
be stayed otherwise than by restraining order which may be 
granted by the Board of Adjustment <j>r by the District Court 
on application and notice and on due cause shown. 
(Ref. Stay of Proceedings pending appeal 10-9-10 
U.C.A., 1953) 
The Board of Adjustment shall set a public hearing on the 
appeal in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1 
of this Chapter. Upon the hearing, any party may appear in 
person or by agent or by attorney. 
In exercising its powers, the Board of Adjustment may reverse 
or affirm, wholly or partly or may modify the order requiremer 
decision or determination appealed from and may make such ord< 
requirement, decision or determination as ought to be made, a; 
to that end shall have all of the powers of the officer from 
whom the appeal is taken. The concurring vote of three (3) 
members of the Board shall be necessary to reverse any 
order, requirement or determination of any such administrative 
official, or to decide in favor of the appellant on any matter 
upon which it is required to pass under any such ordinance, 
or to affect any variation in such Ordinance. 
(Ref. Decision on appeal - vote necessary for reversal 
10-9-13 and 10-9-14, U.C.A., 1953) 
B. Appeals to the City Council. Appeals to the City Council 
may be taken by any person 'aggrieved or affected by any 
decision of the City Planning Commission, Such an appeal may 
be made within fifteen (15) days of the time of the decision of 
the said Planning Commission by filing a notice of appeal with 
the office of the City Recorder. The City Recorder shall then 
forthwith transmit to the City Council all of the papers and 
records related to the action from which the appeal is taken* 
The Clearfield City Council shall set a public hearing on the 
appeal in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1 of 
this Chapter. All persons having any interest in the appeal 
may appear in person or be represented at the hearing. 
The City Council may confirm or overrule the decision of the 
Planning Commission, or may make such amendments to the 
decision as it may deem appropriate. 
C. Judicial Appeal. Any person aggrieved by or affected by 
any decision of the Board of Adjustment or the City Council 
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom 
in any court of competent jurisdiction; provided, petition 
for such relief is presented to the Court within thirty (30) 
days after the filing of such decision in the office of the 
Board of Adjustment or with the City Recorder. 
(Ref. Judicial Review of Board's Decision 10-9-15, 
U.C.A., 1953) 
11-2-6 ANNEXED TERRITORY - ZONING. Any property which, for 
any reason is not designated on the official zoning map as being 
classified in any of the zones established hereby, or any property 
in the process of annexation, or annexed to or consolidated to the 
City of Clearfield subsequent to the effective date of this Chapter, 
shall be deemed to be classified comparably to existing County 
Zoning until the same shall have been otherwise classified in the 
manner set forth in Section 11-2-2 of this Chapter subsequent to 
annexation. 
In order to insure due process and to protect the rights of 
the citizens of Clearfield City, property shall not be reclassified 
to a zone of more intense use concurrently with or prior to 
completion of annexation proceedings, unless otherwise requested 
by the property owner(s) nor shall any Officer or Official of 
Clearfield City utilize reclassification committments as a medium 
of bargaining for the annexation of property in Clearfield City. 
ZONING, BUILDING AND PLANNING 10-9-2.5 
10-9-2.5. Residential facility for handicapped persons per-
mitted in municipal zoning district — Conditions 
for qualification. 
A residential facility for handicapped persons shall be permitted in any 
municipal zoning district, subject to the conditional review process, except a 
district zoned to permit, exclusively, single family dwelling use, if the facility 
conforms to all applicable health, safety, and building codes and is capable of 
use as a residential facility for handicapped perspns without structural alter-
ation which would change the residential character of the structure. For pur-
poses of this section "zoned to permit exclusive^ single family dwelling use** 
means that the applicable ordinance prohibits the occupancy of a housing 
structure by any more than one family. 
A municipality, by ordinance, may provide ttyat no residential facility for 
handicapped persons may be established or maintained within one miie of 
another existing facility. 
The use granted and permitted by this section is nontransferable and termi-
nates if the structure is devoted to a use other than as a residential facility for 
handicapped persons or, if the structure fails to comply with applicable 
health, safety, and building codes. 
The governing body of each municipality ujider locally adopted criteria 
shall adopt zoning ordinances which permit, thitough the grant of conditional 
use permits, the establishment and maintenance of residential facilities for 
handicapped persons within districts zoned to permit exclusively single family 
dwelling use. Such ordinances may require that no residential facility for 
handicapped persons be established or maintained within one mile of another 
existing facility. Those ordinances shall prohibit discrimination against resi-
dential facilities for handicapped persons. 
No person who is being treated for alcoholism or drug abuse shall be placed 
in a residential facility for handicapped persons. Placement shall be on a 
strictly voluntary basis and shall not be a pari of or in lieu of confinement, 
rehabilitation, or treatment in a custodial or correctional type institution 
For purposes of this section, "residential facility for handicapped person" 
means a single-family dwelling structure that is occupied on a 24-hour per 
day basis by eight or less handicapped persons in a family-type arrangement 
under the supervision of house parents or a rtianager. The facility shal be 
operated or licensed and regulated by a state Agency and if not so operated, 
licensed, or regulated, it shall comply with all ^tate standards for group home 
operations. 
For purposes of this section, "handicapped person" means a person wh: is 
nonviolent and who has a severe, chronic disability attributable to a mental or 
physical impairment or to a combination of mental and physical impairments 
which is likely to continue indefinitely and ivhich results in a substantia! 
functional limitation in three or more of th0 following areas of major life 
activity: self-care, receptive and expressive language, learning, mobility self-
direction, capacity for independent living, economic self-sufficiency; and who 
requires a combination or sequence of special interdisciplinary or generic 
care, treatment, or other services that are individually planned and coordi-
nated to allow the person to function in, and contribute to, a residential neigh-
borhood. 
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